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PRESENTATION
This is the ninth year that the weekly dispatches transmitted during a year by ECLAC 
Washington, to ECLAC Santiago and other subregional offices, are gathered in a single 
document.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by subject and ordered 
chronologically within each chapter. The heading o f  each chapter indicates the relative 
saliency o f  these issues within the international economic agenda.
The three most important issues that dominated the international economic agenda, 
throughout the concluding year, are listed in this presentation according to what, avowedly, 
is a very subjective ordering o f  their relative importance.
1) The debate over economic policy and the role o f  government in the United States 
acquired extraordinary intensity, due to the control by the Republican Party o f  the legislative 
majority and the approach o f  this year’ s presidential election. Only time can tell how the 
outcome o f  this confrontation will affect the participation o f  the United States in the world 
economy.
2) The depression o f  the Japanese economy deepened, without immediate reactivation 
in sight. On the contrary, problems o f  bank solvency intensified, consumers remained 
reluctant to spend, land prices continued falling and the government was unable to come out 
with a credible reactivation package. In this context, the yen’ s appreciation, during the first 
half o f  1995, only deepened the slowdown even more.
3) Finally, the Mexican financial crisis showed the vulnerability o f  most emerging 
markets to sudden capital movements, particularly among those low savers o f  the Western 
Hemisphere. Investors remained skeptical throughout the year about sending their money to 
these markets, which contributed to a slowdown in the regional average rate o f  growth o f  
Latin America and the Caribbean for the year running.
Some o f  these issues were described throughout the year in the regular transmissions 
o f  this Dispatch. The purpose o f  gathering these dispatches is to make them available for 
easier consultation in a single document, in case the Washington D .C. vantage point they 
present still has some testimonial value.
Finally, those readers that are not familiarized with the dispatches should be reminded 
that they try to remain within a self-imposed limit o f  750 words, because their purpose is 
only to bring an issue to the reader’ s attention.
1 ECLAC Washington, International Economic Highlights. (LC/WAS/L.2) 17 August 1988; 
(LC/WAS/L.4) 17 March 1989; (LC/WAS/L.8) 15 March 1990; (LC/WAS/L.ll) 22 March 1991; 
(LC/WAS/L.14) 11 March 1992; (LC/WAS/L.17) 11 March 1993; (LC/WAS/L.23) 30 March 1994; 
(LC/WAS/L.27) 21 February 1995.
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I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
I. 1. THE IMF’ S FIRST WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WEO)
(WDW /13/95 17 M AY 1995)
As every year, the advanced copy o f  the first WEO was released on April 23, just 
ahead o f  the annual Spring meetings o f  the Fund and the Bank (W D W /12/95, p .63). In two 
volumes, the first contains the main report and the second the supplementary analyses, 
excluding only the full statistical appendix, to be included in the final version due to be 
published sometime in May.
The main report contains the following chapters: I) economic prospects and policies;
II) policies for sustained growth in industrial countries; III) policy challenges facing 
developing countries; IV) disinflation, growth and foreign direct investment in transition 
countries; and V) a special topic, saving in a growing world economy.
The second volume contains the following annexes: I) factors behind the financial 
crisis in Mexico; II) adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa; III) structural fiscal imbalances in 
smaller countries.
The important progress experienced by the world economy in 1994, according to the 
staff o f  the IMF, shows that a new global expansion has started. After the slowdown o f 
1990-93, "world growth last year was in line with its long term trend o f  3 1/2 to 4 percent 
while world trade expanded by an impressive 9 1/2 percent, well above its long term 
average. "
Output in the industrial countries increased 3 percent in 1994, the highest rate o f  
growth in five years, with buoyant economic conditions in North America and the United 
Kingdom, recoveries in continental Europe, and a modest pickup in Japan. Despite the 
turmoil in some emerging financial markets, in 1994, the developing countries experienced 
an average rate o f  growth o f  6 percent, in line with the last three years. Finally, in the 
economies in transition the picture was mixed, with vigorous economic growth experienced 
by the radical reformers, while output declined in those countries that followed "a less 
comprehensive strategy. "
However, two factors contradicted this positive performance. First, the loss o f  
confidence by investors in some emerging markets, which began before the financial crisis in 
Mexico, and second, the turbulence in exchange markets caused by the principal currencies.
Still, world economic growth is projected "to remain fairly robust during the period 
ahead." The industrialized countries are expected to grow in 1995-96 at an average rate o f
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around 3 percent. The outlook for the economies in transition is also positive, i f  there will 
prevail sound financial policies and structural reforms, their rate o f  expansion can reach 5 
percent or more over the medium term.
By contrast, growth in the developing countries is expected to "slow slightly in 1995- 
96." The Western Hemisphere will show the "most profound slowdown," while Asia will 
moderate its strong rate o f  expansion and Africa and the Middle East will experience "some 
strengthening o f  growth."
Because o f  the financial crisis in Mexico and its contagion effects, the projection for 
the developing countries o f  the Western Hemisphere was revised downwards by one 
percentage point to 2 1/4 percent in 1995. This downward revision o f  the regional average is 
accounted by M exico’ s output expected to decrease by 2 percent in 1995, while growth in 
Argentina is expected to "slow significantly in 1995-96, to around 3 percent." Also, in 1995, 
Peru is projected to slow down to 4.5 percent, less than half o f  the spectacular rate o f  the 
previous year and Venezuela will experience another decline in output o f  2 percent. Only 
Chile, Colombia and Brazil are projected to grow at around 5 percent in 1995, still not 
enough to counter the downward revision o f  the regional average.
The lessons from the Mexican episode are analyzed separately in an annex. To begin 
with, surges in capital flows to developing countries are blamed for excessive liquidity 
expansion, unsustainable external imbalances and excessive real exchange rate appreciation.
In other developing countries o f  the Western Hemisphere, the sudden reversal o f  capital 
flows, particularly o f  portfolio investment, also exposed the fragility o f  banking systems.
Two specific policy lessons are drawn from the Mexican episode "for countries that 
are confronted with shifts in market sentiment." In the short run, to correct domestic and 
external macroeconomic imbalances, monetary conditions should be tightened through 
increases in domestic interest rates and fiscal adjustments, even if the initial imbalances 
originate in the private sector. In the medium term, the underlying causes should be 
addressed, such as low saving and relative price distortions.
The other policy lesson has to do with exchange rate regimes, particularly in those 
countries where the exchange rate is an anchor o f  a wider stabilization strategy. This 
deserves a full quotation. "The initial response to exchange market pressures should consist 
primarily o f  monetary tightening. However, under circumstances o f  sustained pressures, 
accepting a devaluation or abandoning a fixed exchange rate parity may be the only credible 
policy response." In such a case, "to limit the inflationary impact o f  the devaluation," it will 
be necessary to enforce a "tight monetary and credit policy, as well as a fiscal stance that is 
consistent with the new policy regime. "
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I. 2. THE HALIFAX SUMMIT 
(W D W /18/95 21 June 1995)
The leaders o f  the seven most industrialized democracies met in the twenty-first 
summit, over the weekend in Halifax, Nova Scotia--"the poorest comer o f  Canada," 
according to Anne Swardson, from the Washington Post. This choice o f  venue was part o f  a 
deliberate attempt by the hosts, to avoid the usual extravagance and instead display some 
Canadian modesty and austerity. As characterized by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, 
the aim was a "Chevy" not a "Cadillac" summit.
The participating governments were asked to limit the number o f  delegates and the 
press contingent was smaller too. By contrast with last year’ s summit held in Naples, only 
one half o f  the government delegates and one third o f  the press correspondents were present 
in Halifax.
Also, the meetings took place in the empty floors o f  an office building and the 
meeting tables were those used last year at the Naples meeting. Finally, to keep costs under 
the US $25 million, spent seven years ago at the Toronto summit, the government this time 
allowed private sponsors to supply food and services in exchange for advertising.
A German veteran o f  every summit, quoted in the New York Times, declared that 
"he had never seen such a warm welcome, " since the first summit held in Rambouillet, 
France in 1975. Even the final communiqué was leaked and circulated throughout the world 
a week in advance.
However, summits are not only symbols and ritual, there is always some substance 
hidden behind the lavish dinners, the fireworks and the cryptic language o f  the communiqué. 
As recalled by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director o f  the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), at the third annual Sylvia Ostry lecture pronounced in Ottawa only a week before the 
Halifax summit, there have been "some landmarks." For instance, the support for 
multilateral trade, by the Bonn summit o f  1985, opened the door, the following year, to 
launching the Uruguay Round. The Tokyo summit o f  1986 supported the policy coordination 
required to enforce the Plaza agreement on exchange rates, as the Venice summit o f  1987 
endorsed the Louvre Accord. Finally, the Toronto summit o f  1988 approved the granting o f  
debt relief for the poorest countries.
The question is what landmark will be recalled from the Halifax summit. Perhaps 
Halifax will be remembered as the summit that launched the process o f  reform o f  the 
multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) (W DW /19/95, p.5).
This does not mean that there were not other more pressing issues, such as the 
confrontation between Japan and the United States over Japanese automobile imports, or the 
dollar’ s fall. However, these were removed discreetly by means o f  a preliminary press
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conference held jointly by Prime Minister Murayama and President Clinton and by a brief 
mention in the final communiqué. Even the hostilities in Bosnia were adroitly set aside, in a 
statement drafted at the urging o f  the newcomer French President Jacques Chirac.
In the end, the final communiqué remained as the version that was previously leaked. 
It contains sections dedicated to growth and employment; meeting the challenges o f  the 21st. 
century; creating opportunities through open markets; economies in transition; nuclear safety; 
and concludes announcing that next year’ s summit will be held in Lyon, France, from June 
27 to 29.
The section on the challenges o f  the next century is the most detailed and signals the 
kickoff for the process o f  institutional reform. The major challenge is characterized as the 
management o f  the world economy’ s "increased interdependence while working with the 
grain o f  markets and recognizing the growing number o f  important players."
At issue is the prevention o f  crisis, such as this year’ s Mexican episode, amid the 
increased globalization and integration o f  capital markets. The measures proposed include: 
more timely publication o f key economic and financial data; creation o f  an "Emergency 
Financing Mechanism" at the IMF; to expand the General Agreements to Borrow by 
doubling the $28 billion presently available; to support the discussions on a new IMF quota 
review; mandates the IMF to review the role o f  the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs); and 
urges closer cooperation between regulators and supervisors o f  financial institutions and 
markets.
The communiqué also supports other shared objectives, such as promoting sustainable 
development, reducing poverty, safeguarding the environment and preventing and responding 
to disasters and other crises.
Finally, a specific section is dedicated to "reinforcing coherence, effectiveness and 
efficiency o f  institutions," including the MFIs and the United Nations. Mentioned specifically 
is the elimination o f  overlaps between the United Nations Conference on Tnide and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the new World Trade Organization (WTO), and "the roles o f  
certain institutions in light o f  evolving challenges, eg. Regional Economic Commissions and 
UNIDO."
Therefore, several experienced summit watchers concluded that these results were not 
as disappointing as could be expected from a meeting where five o f  the participants, except 
the host and the newly elected President o f  France, were experiencing exacting domestic 
political challenges.
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I. 3. INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN HALIFAX 
(W D W /19/95 28 JUNE 1995)
Extraordinarily, with the final communiqué o f  the Halifax summit (W DW /18/95, 
p .3), the leaders o f  the G-Seven released a background document titled Review o f 
International Financial Institutions. With this unusual release, the G-Seven leaders deemed it 
necessary to present a lengthier explanation and clarification o f  their institutional reform 
proposals. Even so, the background paper contains less and more on institutional reforms 
than the cryptic final communiqué.
For instance, while the paper deals exclusively with the financial institutions, the 
communiqué addresses the need for coordination with those United Nations bodies that deal 
with economic issues. Also, the paper recalls that the mandate to discuss institutional issues 
was approved at last year’ s Naples summit. However, both the paper and the communiqué 
recognize that the events that took place between the two summits have imposed a certain 
degree o f  urgency on the need to reform the institutional framework that presently prevails.
As recalled before Halifax by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director o f  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), three major monetary and financial crises have 
confirmed the wisdom o f  the institutional question asked by the Naples summit. The 
question, referred for its examination to Halifax, was "how can we adapt existing institutions 
and build new institutions to ensure the future prosperity and security o f  our people. "
The three events, identified by Mr. Camdessus as imposing the urgency o f  
institutional reform, are the Mexican episode, the failure o f  Barings and the dollar’ s fall. 
These issues, said Mr. Camdessus perhaps with a bit o f  hyperbole, made o f  Halifax "already 
a summit o f  the 21st century, dealing with the next century’ s challenges."
The following challenges are enumerated in the background paper: 1) "the global 
economy is more integrated"; 2) "world trade has grown steadily and direct and portfolio 
investments have increased sharply"; 3) "capital market liberalization, technological change, 
and financial innovation have transformed the global financial landscape"; 4) "there is greater 
consensus on the role o f  the market, economic incentives, and open policies, and much less 
faith in dirigiste solutions to economic problems"; 5) "a variety o f  global challenges have 
emerged in areas such as environmental stewardship and the importance o f  good 
governance"; 6) "the influence o f  developing countries in the world economy is growing, 
yet, a large portion o f  the world’ s population still lives in extraordinary poverty."
To deal with these challenges, the paper enumerates the following "interrelated 
elements." First, "an improved early warning system is needed to avoid financial shocks." 
Second, "ensure that the capacity exists to induce appropriate policy responses at an early 
stage." Third, "appropriate and adequate financial mechanisms." Fourth, "an effective system 
o f  cooperation among the major industrial countries and multilateral financial institutions is
6
needed, which allows a rapid and concerted response to external shocks." Finally, "there 
may also be a need to look at other mechanisms that might usefully be considered in 
situations o f  financial crisis."
The first institutional response asks the IMF to improve its surveillance activities in 
specific ways. The second institutional response aims at adopting policy responses that are 
"early and appropriate," through the creation o f  two financing mechanisms, a new 
"Emergency Financing Mechanism" at the IMF and the doubling o f  the General Agreements 
to Borrow (GAB) by the G-Ten and other countries. The third institutional response calls for 
strengthening financial market supervision and regulation, through the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision and the International Organization o f  Securities Commissions. The 
fourth institutional response asks the multilateral development banks to allocate resources 
more efficiently, emphasize poverty reduction and to reduce the debt burden o f  the poorest 
countries.
To strengthen "governance and management," two options are suggested about the 
functioning o f  the Interim and the Development Committees. In the first option, both 
committees would be merged into a "single joint Fund-Bank Committee to focus on global 
financial and development issues." The other option is to transform the Development 
Committee into a steering body for the World Bank Group, as the Interim Committee 
oversees the functioning o f  the IMF. In either case, Ministers would only attend the annual 
meetings, while the spring meetings would be attended only by senior officials.
Finally, more coordination is asked between the IMF and the OECD in the area o f  
macroeconomic surveillance, while closer coordination is also asked from the WTO with the 
IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and "trade-related UN bodies to avoid unnecessary 
duplication in their activities." Anyway, all these institutions are asked to be more "cost- 
effective. "
As described, the institutional proposal contained in the background paper does not 
entail profound transformations o f  existing institutions, neither the creation o f  new 
institutions. This is consequent with the premise, stated at the beginning o f  the paper, that 
"the international financial institutions have demonstrated an exceptional degree o f  flexibility 
in adapting to changing demands. Nevertheless, there remain a number o f  areas where 
improvements are both possible and desirable. "
I. 4. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR 
(W DW /20/95 5 JULY 1995)
This time, the World Bank cannot be accused o f  avoiding controversy. This year’ s 
World Development Report (WDR), released on June 29, explores the highly controversial
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issue o f  how the workers o f  the world are adapting to increased levels o f  international 
integration.
After eighteen successive issues, for several reasons, the W DR’ s yearly release is a 
well-established agenda setting exercise. First, because o f  the saliency o f  the topics discussed 
and second, for the influence these reports exercise on what still is the main source o f  
multilateral development lending. Some previous reports were dedicated to less controverted 
issues, such as health and infrastructure, while other more quarrelsome topics, such as the 
environment, poverty, and development strategies, have also been analyzed.
As stated in a news release, the Report comes out against "doomsayers. " Particularly 
those that see in the integration o f  the world economy, coupled to the impressive growth o f  
the labor force in developing countries, "a source o f  falling wages and job insecurity." Also, 
as indicated in the foreword by President Wolfensohn, one goal o f  the Report is to "spark a 
broad and informed debate on these often contentious issues."
The Report’ s chapter headings illustrate this: 1) which development strategies are 
good for workers? 2) is international integration an opportunity or a threat to workers? 3) 
how should governments intervene in labor markets? 4) how can policy choices help workers 
in periods o f  major change? and 5) outlook for workers in the twenty-first century.
To begin, the Report presents some orders o f  magnitude about recent spectacular 
changes in the world’ s work force. In 1978, two-thirds o f  the world’ s laborers lived, one 
third each, under centrally planned economies, or sheltered behind protective barriers. By the 
year 2000, it is projected that only 10 percent o f  the work force will be isolated from the 
world market.
Amid these changes, the most successful development strategies come out o f  East 
Asia, in the form o f  labor-demanding growth, investment in people and infrastructure, 
support for family farms, high saving ratios and vigorous exports. True, the formerly 
centrally planned economies, by contrast, achieved "high degrees o f  equality," but, despite 
high levels o f  investment, labor incomes first stagnated and then collapsed. Also contrasting 
is the case o f  Latin America, where an attempt to bias investment against agriculture and 
sheltering industrial workers behind protective barriers, dictated wage increases and 
job creation in the public sector, but could not overcome highly unequal income distribution.
According to the Report, those who perceive as threatening the international flows o f  
goods, services, persons and capital disregard some facts. First, where "exports have risen 
fast, so have real wages-by an average o f  3 percent per year." Second, one third o f  the 
capital flows to developing countries are foreign direct investment that creates many new 
jobs. Third, migration "has usually brought income gains to those who move, higher 
remittances to those who stay, and increased production o f  goods and services in the host 
countries." Finally, a "small but vocal minority" in the industrialized countries, who fears 
competition from low-wage imports, is reminded that such imports represent only 3 percent 
o f  industrial countries’ GDP.
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The Report also supports public intervention to complement formal and informal 
labor markets. For instance, legislation is not enough to influence labor conditions in 
informal markets, "direct public action" is needed to influence "the working environment and 
the health o f  workers. " In the formal sector, the government needs to set the rules for labor 
management interaction, "spelling out the rights o f  workers and firms, establishing dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and promulgating basic health and safety regulations. " Decentralized 
collective bargaining is recommended, "to determine wages and working conditions." 
According to Michael Walton, the team leader that drafted the Report, unions "can be forces 
for productivity increase, better working conditions, and a better civic society."
However, unions can also have "negative economic effects" when they "behave as 
monopolists" for the protection o f  minority groups. On labor relations, by contrast with wage 
and employment increases, the record o f  the East Asian economies "is less enviable." 
However, it is emphasized that poor labor relations are "not key to East Asia’ s success."
Additionally, "direct government intervention makes sense in dealing with child labor 
and in other cases where the market may produce adverse outcomes, such as discrimination 
against women."
On the linkage between labor standards and trade agreements, the Report recognizes 
that "there is a case for international concern over core standards," understood as "basic 
rights that do not directly raise labor costs." Nonetheless, "it is best to keep multilateral trade 
agreements confined to directly trade-related issues, to prevent protectionist interests from 
misusing such links to reduce trade. "
To conclude, markets are asked to create opportunities, "taking care o f  those who are 
vulnerable or left out, and providing workers with the conditions to make their job choices 
freely, bargain over their conditions o f  work, and take advantage o f  better educational 
opportunities for their children."
I. 5. WHO PREVAILS, THE MARKET OR THE REGULATORS? 
(WDW /24/95 6 SEPTEMBER 1995)
On Monday, August 21, the Washington Post awoke the city with the news that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) blamed Mexican investors for the peso crisis and that the 
Fund supported using controls to regulate capital flows across national borders. This is 
hardly the kind o f  news capable o f  awakening a city where the Congress was in recess and 
the President and almost everybody were on vacation, while the barometer registered the 
longest stretch on record o f  temperatures above 90 degrees, without rain in sight.
Even so, what these news revealed in effect was that the IMF’ s annual report on the 
behavior o f  international capital markets can reach the Post’ s top right-hand column, but only 
in the stillness o f  the Washington summer.
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The news did generate a stampede among journalists to obtain the advance copy o f  the 
report and some interesting reactions. For instance, an editorial in the Wall Street Journal 
said "this is roughly equivalent to the World Trade Organization coming out for high tariffs." 
While the Financial Times saw "a shift o f  position" by the IMF after the Mexican crisis.
Beyond the headlines, the report addresses two main topics: first, the turbulence in 
emerging markets and second, the supervisory and regulatory challenges confronted by the 
financial markets o f  the industrialized economies.
Both o f  these issues are a consequence o f  the profound transformations that are taking 
place in world financial markets. In the terms o f  Henry Kaufman, a prominent practitioner, 
the "new financial world" is characterized by significant deregulation; by widespread 
securitization o f  credit; by expanding use and complexity o f  financial derivatives; by the 
relative decline o f  traditional institutional lenders; by the ascendance o f  "hi-octane" portfolio 
managers with very near-term investment horizons; by corporate treasury departments 
attempting to become profit centers; and by the extraordinary expansion o f  mutual funds.
These are some o f  the changes that are generating turbulence in capital markets and 
that are testing the regulators from the industrialized and the developing economies.
The conclusions drawn by the report on the recent turbulence in emerging markets, 
particularly after the Mexican episode, are that, first, there is less margin o f  maneuver for 
policies that are not aligned with fundamentals. Domestic and foreign investors can simply 
vote with their feet against those polices. It is here that the report, based on data that "should 
be interpreted with caution," claims that Mexican investors initiated the stampede that led to 
the plunge o f  the Mexican peso.
Second, liberalization has also made these emerging markets more vulnerable to 
external events, to panics and to the spread o f  contagion.
Finally, by contrast to the early 80s, the decentralized nature o f  present capital flows, 
on account o f  the shift away from syndicated bank lending, are making more complicated 
attempts at voluntary debt restructuring.
Therefore, the authorities in emerging markets, that experience turbulence, need to 
deal with at least three kinds o f  risks.
The first is the macroeconomic risk derived from the impact o f  sudden capital flows 
on the exchange rate and on inflation. The policy response includes intervention, 
sterilization, fiscal consolidation and the heretical capital controls, which generated the Wall 
Street Journal reaction.
1 0
As stated by Stanley Fischer, the IM F’s first deputy managing director, "we should 
not push developing countries and transition economies to liberalize the capital account too 
fast, for in the absence o f  macroeconomic stability, and a well-developed domestic financial 
system, liberalization can be problematic." Furthermore, the IMF report describes as positive 
examples the experience with capital controls o f  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines.
Other risks are associated with the banking system becoming vulnerable to the effects 
o f  the policy response and to liquidity risks, mainly caused by the reliance on short-term debt 
finance indexed in foreign currency.
For the capital markets o f  industrialized countries, present difficulties come from the 
challenge posed to regulators by the failures experienced by global derivative markets. The 
growth figures o f  derivative markets presented in the report are staggering. For instance, all 
outstanding derivative contracts increased "from $2 trillion at the end o f  1986 to more than 
$20 trillion at the end o f  1994, an average annual growth rate o f  140 percent."
The challenges are mainly that while "capital markets are becoming increasingly 
global, the rules under which these markets and institutions operate remain largely national." 
In other terms, the regulators are running behind the markets, therefore, there is an urgent 
need for increased international cooperation among regulatory authorities.
In conclusion, the response to the question o f  who prevails in these increasingly 
globalized circumstances is that both liberalization and regulation should prevail. Because 
neither the market by itself, nor the regulators alone will be sufficient to avoid present 
volatility.
I. 6. DEFIANT DERIVATIVES
(WDW /28/95 5 OCTOBER 1995)
Several incidents o f  spectacular losses, surprising most observers, have renewed the 
debate about the regulation o f  derivative contracts. The recent collapse o f  Barings, one o f  the 
oldest investment banks established in 1762, was preceded by other spectacular losses by the 
treasurer o f  the affluent Orange County, in California and by MG Corporation, a U.S. 
subsidiary o f  the German Metallgesellshaft AG.
All these losses, attributed to transactions in derivative contracts, revealed that it took 
a while before supervisors and regulators became aware o f  them. Such slackness was 
evidenced again only last week, when it was revealed that a bond-trader from the Daiwa 
Bank in New York lost $1.1 billion, over the last eleven years, without generating suspicions 
among internal auditors and supervisors, or external inspectors.
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These incidents have brought to the forefront the debate about the degree and kind o f  
regulation required by the spectacular growth experienced by derivative markets in the 
present decade. As defined in a newsletter for economic educators, published by the Federal 
Reserve Bank o f  Chicago, a derivative is "a financial contract with its value and payments 
based on another asset. " One o f  the oldest and best known derivative is a futures contract, 
transacted in the Chicago Board o f  Trade, founded in 1848. Besides commodity futures, 
modem derivatives include futures and options on interest rates, on currencies and on stock 
market indexes.
Transactions in these instruments have led to the "spectacular growth o f  derivative 
markets," described in the last report on international capital markets released by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (WDW /24/95, p .8). The IMF estimates that the value o f  
"all outstanding exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivative contracts increased from 
less than $2 trillion at the end o f  1986 to more than $20 trillion at the end o f  1994, an 
average annual growth rate o f  140 percent."
One aspect o f  this rapid expansion is considered "worrisome" by the IMF, since it is 
mostly banks that have become involved in these transactions. The IMF’ s concern is based 
on the experience that "rapid expansions in certain types o f  financial exposures" have led to 
"major losses during periods o f  consolidation." Furthermore, there is evidence that 
transactions in derivative contracts are concentrated among a small number o f  major 
commercial banks. For instance, a paper in the Federal Reserve Bulletin o f  September 1995, 
reveals that in the United States "the number o f  banks involved in derivatives has risen since 
1990." However, the number is "still relatively small-about 600 as o f  March 1995," while 
"the top fifteen banks hold more than 95 percent o f  the derivatives contracts."
Amid this impressively concentrated expansion, several regulatory initiatives have 
been adopted, some o f  them aimed at increasing the "transparency" o f  these transactions. At 
issue is the assessment o f  the "safety and soundness" o f  the financial institutions involved in 
derivative contracts, to avoid the risk that incidents o f  heavy losses, as those mentioned 
above, may endanger the whole financial system. However, the IMF recognizes that there is 
no consensus about the need for transparency. Some participants refuse to disclose 
information about the methods they use, because their competitors may benefit from such 
disclosures.
The adoption o f  different regulatory initiatives shows that at least there is consensus 
that traditional methods for evaluating risk, such as capital requirements, have become less 
relevant. This is also the case o f  accounting standards, or o f  the practice o f  reporting 
performance annually or semiannually.
Some initiatives proposed address the need for disclosure and they have originated in 
the private sector, by the prestigious think-tank known as the Group o f  Thirty and by the 
Institute for International Finance (IIF), to which belong almost 200 commercial banks from 
all over the world. In the United States, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
increased the required disclosures about derivatives for 1994 reports in a Statement o f
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Financial Accounting Standards Number 119, known as SFAS 119. Internationally, the 
central banks o f  the Group o f  Ten organized a working group o f  the Euro-currency Standing 
Committee, chaired by Peter Fischer, Executive Vice President o f  the Federal Reserve Bank 
o f  New York. The Fischer group made recommendations about the disclosure o f  quantitative 
information on market and credit risk exposures.
Finally, the most radical departure from traditional methods o f  risk assessment is 
being circulated by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. This new approach is 
based on using the banks’ own internal risk-management models to estimate capital adequacy 
requirements. However, when this method is adopted, as expected by the end o f  this year, it 
will coexist with the rules approved by the Commission o f  the European Union on capital 
requirements for financial institutions, which are not based on internal models.
In dealing with the spectacular growth o f  derivatives, supervisors and regulators 
appear running behind the market. The "good news" is, according to the IMF, that the 
existing arrangements have thus far contained potential systemic spillovers.
I. 7. THE IMF’S SECOND WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WEO) 
(W DW /29/95 11 OCTOBER 1995)
This year’ s second WEO was released by the IMF staff, as usual, a week before the 
inauguration o f  the annual meetings o f  the World Bank and the Fund, held this year in 
Washington, D.C.
The world economy, according to the IMF, has "proven quite resilient" to recent 
turbulence in financial markets. This turbulence was mainly caused by corrections in the 
misalignment o f  major currencies and by the adjustment o f  portfolios in the so-called 
emerging markets o f  the developing countries.
Despite the turmoil, the rate o f  expansion o f  the world economy is expected to reach 
3.7 percent in 1995, a slight revision downwards o f  the projections made last May. The 
revision was due to a correction in the projected growth o f  the industrial countries, o f  half a 
percentage point for 1995. By contrast, growth in the developing economies remains at a 
robust 6 percent, despite the downward revision o f  the May projections on growth in Latin 
America, because o f  the performance o f  Mexico and Argentina. Finally, growth in the 
transition economies is projected to be stronger among those that achieved stabilization 
earlier.
Within this "relatively positive" picture, in the terms o f  the Fund’ s Research Director 
Michael Mussa, the major exception among the industrialized economies remains Japan. 
According to the WEO, the Japanese economy "has yet to show convincing signs o f  recovery
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from the deep and protracted downturn that began in late 1991." Therefore, the forecast for 
Japan in 1996 is revised downwards from 3.5 percent to 2.2 percent.
Japanese policy makers face what is characterized as "a unique policy challenge," 
posed by spreading price declines, labor market slackness and continued weakness o f  asset 
prices. Additionally, there is the wide pressure exercised by the strong yen and many 
disruptions among financial institutions, such as recent failures o f  credit unions and the heavy 
loan losses that appear in the portfolios o f  bigger and smaller banks.
An attempt to confront some o f  these challenges has taken the form o f  a stimulus 
package, approved on September 20, amounting to 14.2 trillion yen, or 3 percent o f  GDP. 
The package includes mainly expenditure increases, such as public investments amounting to
1.5 percent o f  GDP, to stimulate activity in the real estate market through land purchases. 
Consequently, in 1995, Japan’ s public sector structural deficit will increase to 5.5 percent o f  
GDP and to 6.25 percent in 1996.
Among the developing economies there were some contrastingly positive 
performances, with those o f  Asia expected to continue growing at more than 8 percent, for 
the fourth consecutive year. Meanwhile, average performance o f  the developing economies o f  
the Western Hemisphere was affected by the Mexican crisis and its effect on Argentina.
Even so, the global projections for 1996 are more optimistic. Since world output is 
projected to increase at more than 4 percent, growth is thus expected to be positive across 
the board in 1996.
The industrialized economies are projected to grow moderately at 2.4 percent. The 
developing economies will continue growing at a strong 6.3 percent, including those o f  the 
Western Hemisphere, which are projected to grow 4 percent. Even the transition economies 
will grow positively in 1996. After consecutive negative performances in the last three years, 
the economies in transition are projected to grow at a rate o f  3.4 percent.
A main conclusion, drawn in the WEO from these figures, is that the performance o f  
some developing countries is no longer fully synchronized, as it used to, with that o f  the 
industrialized countries. In Asia and in the Western Hemisphere, between 1990-93, growth 
continued despite the slowdown in the industrialized economies. By contrast, Africa and the 
Middle East "have continued to be closely influenced by developments in the industrial 
countries."
The chapter dedicated to the developing economies celebrates their increasing 
openness, because the robust growth rates that prevailed among them have been associated 
with their integration in the world economy. Nonetheless, the benefits from openness have 
reached unevenly all o f  the developing economies.
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While the Asian economies have increased spectacularly their relative shares in world 
export markets, the relative participation o f the Latin American economies has stagnated at 
low levels. For instance, the relative participation o f  Argentina and Brazil, together at 1.3 
percent, is almost the same as that o f  Thailand, at 1.2 percent, that is among the smallest 
shares for Asian economies.
Released in a single volume, on October 4, 1995, the advanced copy o f  the WEO 
contains the following chapters: I) economic prospects and policies; II) the world economy in 
1995-96; III) financial market turmoil and economic policies in industrial countries; IV) 
increasing openness o f  developing countries—opportunities and risks; and V) policy 
challenges facing transition countries. The volume also contains several boxes and one annex 
dedicated to the exchange rate effects o f  fiscal consolidation.
The W EO’ s final version will be released by the end o f  October, including the 
complete statistical appendix which does not appear in the advanced copy released to the 
media.
I. 8. THE PARANOIA OF GLOBALIZATION 
(W DW /32/95 1 NOVEMBER 1995)
Several indicators confirm that there exists a trend toward the increased globalization 
o f  the world economy. Among the most often quoted are the $1 trillion in daily foreign 
exchange transactions, or the $20 trillion outstanding in derivative contracts. Also mentioned, 
is the 125 percent growth o f  international trade in the last decade, although the spectacular 
growth in cross-border financial transactions is more revealing o f  increased globalization.
As described by the Chairman o f  the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan, in the 
last decade, the stock o f  cross-border assets held by banks increased 3 1/2 times; while the 
annual issuance o f  international securities was four times greater, over the same period. 
Technological change and ideas, according to Chairman Greenspan, have "significantly 
altered the nature o f  output so that it has become increasingly conceptual and less physical."
All these trends, says the Vice Chairman o f  the Federal Reserve Alan Blinder, have 
now made it "chic" to assert that the global economy is already here. Correspondingly, the 
national economies are perceived as gradually losing the capacity to control their own 
destinies.
However, there are also indications that the globalized economy is not quite here yet. 
If only because some indicators o f  globalization are used to justify the adoption o f  
protectionist measures and isolationist postures. This reaction is described by University o f  
Michigan Professor Marina von Neumann Whitman as causing a "national paranoia about 
globalization."
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It is this reaction that is feeding the belief that the trade deficit and foreign investment 
are causing unemployment. There is even a formula to quantify their impact. For instance, 
the Republican candidate for president Patrick Buchanan has used this measure in a Wall 
Street Journal op-ed, titled "An American Economy for Americans." In his terms, if  the 
trade deficit reaches $200 billion this year, based on the estimate that $1 billion in exports 
equals 20,000 jobs, this will mean a net loss o f  four million jobs.
Professor Whitman counters that the increase in the trade deficit is "statistically 
associated" with lower unemployment, because more imports result from higher levels o f  
income.
Another assertion challenged by Whitman is that free trade agreements are associated 
with flights o f  investment, from high-wage to low-wage countries, to produce cheaper 
exports that flow back to the investing country. Professor Whitman responds that only 11 
percent o f  the production o f  U.S. firms abroad gets back to the U.S. market, with 3 percent 
o f  the total originating in developing countries.
Additionally, in the last quarter century, the United States has not lost ground in 
export markets. According to the IMF, the relative participation o f  the United States in world 
exports was 12.1 percent in 1970 and this figure increased to 13.3 per cent in 1994. The 
economies that more than tripled their relative participation in world exports are those o f  
East Asia. For example, in the last 25 years, China has moved from 0.8 to 2.4 percent;
Hong Kong from 1.0 to 3.5 percent; and Thailand from 0.3 to 1.1 percent. Meanwhile, some 
European and Latin American countries have lost ground.
Other indicators reveal that the trend toward globalization has yet to make a dent in 
investor preferences. The IMF has estimated that domestic ownership exceeds 90 percent in 
the three largest stock exchanges-Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Also, 
despite an impressive growth in capital flows to emerging markets, these investments 
represent only 1 percent o f  the total assets held by institutional investors from the United 
States.
Consequently, the figures still do not support the anxiety about the loss o f  national 
control, allegedly caused by the globalization o f  the world economy. Paraphrasing Churchill, 
the Fed Vice Chairman Alan Blinder concludes, "open, competitive markets in which 
participants seek profits is the worst way to allocate capital-until you consider the 
alternatives. "
Vice Chairman Blinder also warns that "the voices o f  protection that you still 
occasionally hear in this country and others are not only counsels o f  despair, bad economics, 
and often the worst kind o f  special pleading. They are also relics o f  a past that, I am pretty 
sure, will never return."
Paradoxically, this paranoia caused by the trend toward globalization comes at a time 
when representatives o f  the developing economies are preaching the benefits o f  free trade.
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At the inauguration o f  the last summit meeting o f  the non-aligned countries, for 
instance, the President o f  Colombia called on the participants to fight against protectionism 
and to work toward true free trade. At the same meeting, held in Cartagena, Colombia, the 
President o f  Bolivia said "let’ s start trading among ourselves instead o f  complaining about 
the developed world." And the President o f  Indonesia urged the members o f  the non-aligned 
movement to give top priority to economic issues.
The paranoia, generated by some indicators o f  economic globalization, is the 
equivalent o f  believing that, at its fiftieth anniversary, the United Nations is close to 
achieving enough power to dominate the world.
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II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1. ANXIETY AMID GOOD NEWS IN 1995 
(W DW /1/95 18 JANUARY 1995)
Paradoxically, the strong performance and low inflation o f  the U.S. economy in the 
last quarter o f  1994 has generated anxiety among forecasters. Since very few anticipated the 
last quarter’ s more than four percent in GDP growth, this year’ s predictions are anxiously 
wondering how long will the good times last. The question is not if  the economy will 
slowdown in 1995, but when and by how much.
As admitted by Alan Greenspan, the Chairperson o f  the Federal Reserve Board 
(FED), in a statement to the Joint Economic Committee o f  Congress on December 7, "there 
is very little evidence throughout this economy o f any degree o f  slowdown." Also, this 
strong performance was accompanied by a moderate increase in the consumer price index 
(CPI) o f  2.7 percent for the year as a whole, the same as in 1993. The core index, excluding 
food and energy prices, increased only 2.6 percent, the smallest increase since 1965. 
Moreover, in its third year o f  recovery, the economy created 3 million jobs pushing 
unemployment down to 5.8 percent.
These indicators showed how hazardous it was to try to forecast the performance o f  
the U.S. economy in 1994. For instance, out o f  the 59 economists that participate in the 
semiannual Wall Street Journal survey, o f  June 1994, only two predicted the strong 
performance o f  the U.S. economy during the second half o f  the past year. One o f  them was 
the former governor o f  the Federal Reserve Wayne Angelí, now chief economist at Bear, 
Steams & Co., the other was Gail Fosler o f  the Conference Board.
That Mr. Angelí foresaw in June annual economic growth at 4 percent or more, for 
the rest o f  the year, even raised some eyebrows. Mr. Angelí’ s accuracy, in predicting some 
decisions adopted by the FED, led House Banking Committee Chairperson Henry Gonzalez 
(D-Tex) to ask the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to investigate if Mr. Angelí 
was using inside information from his previous position. As reported, an internal FED 
investigation did not reveal wrongdoing.
By contrast, there is wider consensus among this year’ s forecasts, issued by the 
economists surveyed in the Wall Street Journal. The consensus is that this year will witness 
the effects o f  the six interests rate increases approved by the FED last year, including those 
o f  the increase that the FED is expected to approve by the end o f  this month.
Consequently, optimists expect the FED to achieve the "soft landing" that it is 
seeking, by slowing down the economy real GDP growth close to the noninflationary rate o f
2.5 per cent.
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Most economists agree that, during the first half o f  1995, the economy will grow at 
an annual rate o f  2.9 percent and o f  2.5 percent in the second half o f  the year. This 
represents a slowdown from the rate o f  growth o f  more than 4 percent o f  1994. Even so, in 
1995, most forecasters surveyed do not see a recession and expect inflation to remain 
moderate.
Government economists agree with some o f  these projections. The Chairperson o f  the 
President’ s Council o f  Economic Advisors, Laura D ’Andrea Tyson in 1995 foresees a rate o f  
real growth o f  2.7 percent, with unemployment climbing to 6.2 percent and an inflation rate 
o f  3.2 percent. Also, the vice-chairman o f the FED, Alan Blinder expects that growth will 
slow down in 1995 to between 2.5 and 2.75 percent.
The expectation that the recession will happen in early 1996 is seen as hurting both 
the Republican Congress and President Clinton. It used to be that a recession was supposed 
to hurt the incumbent. Thus, the fact that the last recovery initially was not strong enough 
explained why it hurt President Bush’ s reelection. However, that the recovery only gained 
strength last year did not help the incumbents to retain their control o f  the Congress.
As Sylvia Nassar said in the New York Times, "blessed with some o f  the best 
economic numbers in a generation, President Clinton cannot seem to communicate the good 
news." The conclusion drawn by Keith Bradsher, also in the New York Times, from these 
contradictory signals is that recessions hurt incumbents, while recoveries help them much 
less.
Be it as it may, the most decisive influence on the performance o f  the economy does 
not reside in the Executive or in the Congress. It is the control exercised by the FED on 
interest rates that will determine the onset and the deepness o f  the recession, if  any.
Nobody knows if  last year’ s interest rate increases will slow down the economy 
earlier, to the point o f  starting a recession by the end o f  this year. For the politicians from 
both parties the question is who will be blamed, the Republican Congress or the Clinton 
Administration.
Meanwhile, the debate now consists o f  guessing if the FED can engineer the "soft 
landing," by bringing down the rate o f  growth to the proverbial 2.5 percent, consistent with 
a steady unemployment rate. Or, if  the FED overshoots, by stepping on the brakes too 
harshly, it will cause a "crash landing" that will sink the economy into recession.
No wonder, James Glassman concluded in the Washington Post that "there is no 
future in foretelling the economy." Instead, in 1995, all time and energy are dedicated to 
"the joy  and anguish o f  FEDwatching."
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II. 2. THE STATE OF THE UNION: SEARCHING FOR THE CENTER 
(W DW /3/95 1 FEBRUARY 1995)
Last week, President Clinton delivered the longest State o f  the Union address o f  his 
mandate. During eighty-two minutes, o f  what some saw as a long but masterful delivery, the 
President explained his vision o f  what he called a "New Covenant." This "covenant" is based 
on "an old idea: That all Americans have not just a right, but a responsibility to rise as far as 
their God-given talents and determination can take them, and to give something back to their 
communities and their country in return."
The New Covenant should serve as the foundation for the accomplishment o f  three 
basic objectives: a new economy, a new government, and leadership abroad. These three 
objectives give content to President Clinton’ s vision o f  the center.
The new economy reaches out to the middle class, to help "hard-working families" 
meet the costs o f  raising and educating their children, obtain training for higher paying jobs, 
buy a first home, save for their retirement. The new economy also reaches out to lower- 
income workers by proposing a controversial increase in the minimum wage. While 
promising to continue "vigilance on the deficit," the new economy offers to protect social 
security and oppose Medicare cuts. Finally, in recognition o f  past frustrations, the path to 
"health security" will be undertaken step-by-step.
The new government will be smaller and more effective, "less costly and smarter- 
leaner not meaner. " For this purpose, the President called for the approval o f  lobbying and 
campaign reforms and the continuation o f  cuts in the federal bureaucracy and in unnecessary 
spending, particularly through the line-item veto. Some o f  these proposals were applauded by 
the opposition, such as the reform o f the welfare system, into a system o f  work and 
responsibility, securing the borders against illegal immigration, and the fight against crime. 
While others were not applauded, such as keeping the ban on assault weapons or building on 
the success o f  the Americorps national service program.
Finally, the exercise o f  leadership abroad reaches out to the internationalists from 
both parties. In the President’ s terms, "security depends upon our continued world leadership 
for peace, freedom, and democracy. W e cannot be strong at home without being strong 
abroad."
The first item in the international agenda was the financial crisis in Mexico, the only 
Latin American issue mentioned in the speech. The President explained that it was necessary 
to act promptly, "for the sake o f  millions o f  Americans whose livelihoods are tied to 
M exico’ s well-being." Additionally, the President repeated "this is not a loan, this is not 
foreign aid, this is not a bail-out." To help "put Mexico back on track," the President said, 
"we’ ll be giving a guarantee, like co-signing a note with good collateral that will cover our 
risk." Finally, "together with the bipartisan leadership," the President called on Congress to 
pass "quickly" the legislation containing the Mexican package.
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Other items in the international agenda were the approval o f  the START II treaty to 
eliminate 5,000 nuclear weapons; to lead the world into the extension o f  the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty; to intensify the fight against international terrorism; and to maintain 
"the best equipped, best trained and best prepared fighting force on Earth."
How close the President came to find the center o f  the political spectrum may be 
answered by the fact that the speech was severely criticized by both liberals and 
conservatives.
For instance, the Washington Post editorialized that the speech "tried too hard to 
fulfill too many political imperatives at once. " Republican strategist William Kristol saw the 
address as the "most conservative . . . ever delivered by a 20th century Democratic 
President." Not so, said Richard Cohen, for whom "the embrace was too wide and too thin."
Robert Novak agreed that the speech "often sounded more conservative than any 
pronouncement by a Democratic president in this century, but it was regularly interspersed 
with liberal caveats." For David Broder it was "a speech about everything, and therefore 
about nothing. It was a huge missed opportunity."
In the end, the speech revealed how difficult it will be for the President to find the 
proverbial center by agreeing with the Republicans on certain issues, while reassuring his 
own party that he will continue supporting other issues that belong to the traditional 
Democratic agenda.
As described by R.W . Apple Jr., in the New York Times, "the months ahead will 
center around a battle for the symbolic high ground: are the Republicans the agents o f  change 
and the Democrats the defenders o f  the bureaucratic status quo? Or are the Democrats the 
agents o f  change and the Republicans the reactionary champions o f  trickle-down economics?"
Be it as it may, after the speech and for the first time in more than six months, the 
President’ s job approval rating increased nine percentage points to 54 percent, according to a 
Washington Post - ABC News poll. By contrast, House Speaker Newt Gingrich’ s approval 
rating rose five percentage points, to 40 percent, while the disapproval rating o f  his 
performance increased by eleven percentage points, to 48 percent.
As E.J. Dionne Jr. commented in the Washington Post, "however you cut it, the 
voters were a lot less rough on the president than the analysts were. "
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II. 3. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF THE UNION 
(W DW /6/95 22 FEBRUARY 1995)
In this year’ s letter o f  transmission to the Congress o f  his Economic Report. President 
Clinton describes 1994 as a year o f  outstanding performance for the economy o f  the United 
States. In his own terms, "today there is no country in the world with an economy as strong 
. . .  as full o f  opportunity, as full o f  hope. "
For 1995, the prospects described by the President are just as good, based on the 
execution o f  the Administration’ s economic strategy. The aims o f  the strategy are to continue 
reducing the federal fiscal deficit; preparing the economy for competition in the next century; 
expanding opportunities through free and fair trade; carrying out health care and welfare 
reform; and reinventing government.
In the short-term, the Administration’ s forecast "expects the economic expansion to 
moderate in 1995 as the effects o f  increases in interest rates to date spread more broadly 
throughout the economy." The growth rate in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
expected to reach 2.4 percent and the rate o f  inflation to remain roughly constant at 3 
percent. Thus, in 1995, the economy will achieve a "so-called soft-landing."
The annual report o f  the Council o f  Economic Advisers (CEA), that follows the 
President’ s message o f  transmission to Congress, expands on each o f  the economic strategy’s 
elements mentioned above. It contains the following chapters: 1) implementing a national 
economic strategy; 2) the macroeconomy in 1994 and beyond; 3) expanding the nation’ s 
productive capacity; 4) public and private sector initiatives to promote economic efficiency 
and growth; 5) improving skills and incomes; and 6) liberalizing international trade.
Deficit reduction, the first chapter explains, is not an end in itself, it is a means to 
increased national savings and investment in an economy that globally is performing well, 
but where "real median family income in 1993 is about at the same level it was in 1973." 
Furthermore, "this stagnation o f  incomes has been accompanied by a growing inequality, 
with larger and larger shares o f  total income going to the top fifth o f  the income 
distribution." Therefore, the President, with the release o f  the Economic Report, also sent to 
Congress initiatives proposing the increase in the minimum wage and a "Middle Class Bill o f  
Rights," to provide tax relief to "the people who need it most." In President Clinton’ s terms, 
"an America that, in our finest moments, has always grown together, now grows apart."
The proposal for further deficit reduction and the proposed middle class tax cut are 
contrasted, in the following chapter dedicated to the macroeconomy, with the recent tax and 
expenditure proposals contained in the Republican "Contract with America."
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The Administration’ s forecast for the economy is also discussed in this chapter, 
including some risks to the forecast. Some o f  these include the risk o f  overshooting, the 
possibility o f  stalling in international economic growth, particularly because o f  the cut in 
exports that will result from the slowdown in the Mexican economy. Finally, among the 
risks, the Report mentions the "substantial uncertainty about future congressional action in 
matters that can influence the paths o f  output, deficits, and interest rates over the medium 
run."
To expand productive capacity, the Report focuses on the sustainable growth rate o f  
the economy and on the trend in productivity growth. The role o f  government in boosting the 
sustainable growth potential o f  the economy is two pronged. First, to promote a high level o f 
saving through the most direct means, such as the reduction o f  its own deficit and second, to 
promote additional investment in both human and physical capital.
Government is expected to contribute to the improved performance o f  markets, 
through the promotion o f  competition, remedying harmful externalities, such as pollution, 
and the provision o f  public goods, such as security, education, research and development. 
Also, to correct its own inefficiencies, government should "reinvent" itself, for instance, 
through the streamlining o f  purchasing practices, expected to generate more than $50 billion 
in savings. Finally, government can stimulate economic growth, accelerating private 
investment in sectors such as telecommunications and investing in science and technology.
To sustain rapid growth in employment and wages, the Administration is carrying out 
"an ambitious agenda o f  lifelong learning, " that includes transforming the unemployment 
system into a reemployment system.
Finally, the Report describes an agenda for liberalizing international trade, based on 
the Administration’ s previous achievements, such as the approval o f  the Uruguay Round, the 
entry into force o f  the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Summits o f the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and o f  the Americas, and the Framework 
for a New Economic Partnership with Japan. The Administration’ s trade policy is based on 
mutually supportive objectives pursued in negotiations at the multilateral, plurilateral/regional 
and bilateral levels. The "final component" o f  the Administration’ s trade policy is domestic 
policy, because "trade adds to the opportunities and dynamism o f the economy, and to the 
adjustments required over time."
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II. 4. THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET 
(WDW /34/95 15 NOVEMBER 1995)
In an approaching election year, the standoff between Congress and the Executive, 
over how to deal with the U.S. federal budget deficit, could be easily dismissed as normal 
posturing among politicians. After all, the present is the tenth "shutdown" experienced by the 
federal government since 1981.
The markets have not reacted to the confrontation yet, perhaps because they are 
assuming that in the end there will be a last minute agreement that avoids the worst. Even 
so, the contenders have been admonished about the perils o f  failing to come to an agreement.
For instance, the Chairman o f  the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan has written to the 
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Alfonse D ’ Amato (R-N .Y .) that the borrowing 
authority o f  the Treasury "need not be part o f  the process." Chairman Greenspan also 
declared that failure to agree "would signal that the United States is not capable o f  putting its 
fiscal house in order," which would have "serious, adverse consequences for financial 
markets and economic growth."
Also, Standard & Poor’ s Corporation, the most prestigious credit rating agency, has 
declared that it is "increasingly concerned about the global financial market ramifications o f  
the current U.S. budget impasse." Therefore, there is a risk that U.S. bonds could be rated 
below the triple-A rating, as those o f  other less fiscally responsible governments.
However, beyond the immediate consequences and the political bickering, recent 
studies reveal that to dismiss the confrontation as mere political posturing, this time, would 
be superficial.
A recent study, by the heads o f  the research department o f  the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), concludes that the fiscal deficits that prevail today in all the industrialized 
countries are due to profound and complex causes. The IMF’ s director and the assistant 
director o f  research Michael Mussa and Paul Masson presented the study to a symposium on 
"budget deficits and debt, " organized by the Federal Reserve o f  Kansas City, in Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming, on August 31-September 2, 1995.
Among the main conclusions presented by Mussa and Masson is that, traditionally, 
budget deficits were a response to extraordinary circumstances, such as the two world wars 
and the Great Depression. Therefore, the return to normalcy meant also a return to budget 
balance. The exception has only happened in the last two decades, during which the 
industrial countries have exhibited "persistent budget deficits" and "substantial increases in 
debt/GDP ratios," without experiencing major emergencies.
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Mussa and Masson also conclude that the causes o f  these persistent deficits cannot be 
found in the change in the role o f  government that followed the Great Depression, neither in 
the Keynesian prescription for deficit spending to compensate for cyclical downturns. For 
one thing, because "sizable and persistent deficit spending only started in the 1970s, when 
the influence o f  Keynseanism was waning."
The culprit, starting in 1975, are the "large increases in social security spending," 
turned into "entitlements . . . increasingly divorced from the normal budgetary process. " 
Furthermore, present levels o f  debt to GDP ratios are not sustainable, because o f 
demographic trends, such as the increase in lifespans and the decline in birthrates; the 
substantial increase in health care costs; the slowdown in economic growth; and the 
inflationary pressures o f  the last five decades.
Some o f  these conclusions were used as inputs in a recent study on saving, investment 
and real interest rates, released by the Deputies o f  the Group o f  Ten (G-lO)--Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and the United States.
The first conclusion presented by the G-10 deputies is that "there appears to have 
been a trend increase in the real interest rate o f  around 100 basis points in most G-10 
countries over the past 35 years, to about 4 percent presently." The study also highlights that 
"national saving rates have declined by nearly 5 percent o f  GDP." The cause o f  this decline 
is found in "a reduction in the saving rate o f  the public sector." In all, the G-10 deputies 
conclude, "the secular rise in the real interest rate is due to a decline in the saving rate- 
driven largely by fiscal deficits—which has outweighed a parallel reduction in desired 
investment. "
Therefore, "a reduction in public deficits will unambiguously raise national saving" 
and fiscal consolidation will "put downward pressure on interest rates." Additionally, fiscal 
policy "should aim to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio in times when the economy is not subject 
to adverse shocks. "
For the peace o f  mind o f  the developing and the transition economies, the G-10 study 
asserts that their "capital demands" are not "a major source o f  secular upward pressure on 
global interest rates." Also, they are advised not to repeat the industrial economies’ past 
mistakes and miscalculations.
For the reasons found both in the IMF and the G-10 studies, the confrontation over 
balancing the budget in the United States should be closely followed. Particularly because o f  
its anticipated influence on the fiscal discipline o f  the industrialized economies.
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III. THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
III. 1. JAPAN IN RECESSION, AGAIN?
(WDW /21/95 12 JULY 1995)
Behind the barrage o f  news about the trade confrontation between the United States 
and Japan and about the dollar’ s fall, it was seldom noticed that, in the first quarter o f  1995, 
the Japanese economy barely escaped falling again into a recession.
Had it not been for the announcement by the Japanese government, last June 20, that 
in the first quarter o f  this year gross domestic product grew by a meager one tenth o f  1 
percent, technically, the Japanese economy would have fallen into a recession. According to 
the accepted definition, if this year’ s first quarter weak performance would have been 
negative, followed by the slump o f  3.9 percent in GDP registered during the last quarter o f 
1994, the economy would be in recession after two successive quarters o f  negative growth.
However, if gross national product (GNP) is used, the economy registered, in the first 
quarter o f  1995, negative growth o f  0.2 percent, followed by a contraction o f  3.7 percent in 
the last quarter o f  1994. Technically, this places the Japanese economy in recession.
Beyond the technicalities, as described by Tomoko Fujii, an economist from Salomon 
Brothers in Tokyo quoted in the Wall Street Journal, the paltry rate o f  growth o f  this year’ s 
first quarter is "a slump." Furthermore, since the last negative growth figures date only from 
the last quarter o f  1993, some observers have concluded that the Japanese economy may be 
experiencing the longest downturn o f  modern times.
Several other indicators support this conclusion. Prices continue to fall down at record 
rates. The GDP deflator fell 0.8 percent in the first quarter o f  1994, the largest drop in 
prices since the third quarter o f  1958. This figure is also the third successive quarter o f  
deflation, "the longest stretch o f  price declines in postwar Japanese history." Some analysts 
fear that the economy may fall into "hyperdeflation," and therefore, into a "depression," 
defined as "a recession that policymakers can’ t stop despite aggressive monetary and fiscal 
stimulus."
Another indicator that has registered unprecedented records is unemployment, which, 
at 3.2 percent in May, is still low by contrast with other industrialized economies. However, 
in March, the unemployment rate among young persons under 24 years reached 7.5 percent.
Meanwhile, the Nikkei 225 stock price index reached the lowest point in almost three 
years. Last Tuesday, before regaining some strength the following Friday, the Nikkei
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average closed at 14599.68, the lowest point in two years and ten months. Such low 
performance by stock prices, dropping by two thirds since 1989, added to a steep fall in land 
prices, which have fallen by half since 1991, hurt the commercial banks, in whose ranks are 
found the five largest banks in the world. As Paul Blustein reported in the Washington Post. 
Fuji Bank’ s portfolio, the third largest in the world, breaks even at a Nikkei index o f  14,371, 
while other more exposed banks, such as the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank breaks even at 
15,088.
In the Japanese press, the most common interpretation o f  these events is found in 
what is called the "super high yen," or the 16 per cent rise o f  the yen against the dollar. 
According to the Nihon Kezai Shimbun (Nikkei!. one reason for the weakness o f  Japan’ s 
recent economic recovery can be found in the levels o f  private sector capital investment. Due 
to the "super high yen," reports the Nikkei, corporations are moving their production bases 
overseas, or "hollowing out" Japan’ s industrial base. This has also led to several 
cancellations by large assembly manufacturers o f  their capital investment plans in Japan.
The prevailing concern about deflation is also attributed to the yen’ s appreciation and 
the consequent availability o f  lower priced imports. According to the Nikkei, this is 
equivalent to "prosperity without profit, " whereby production increases while profits are 
decreasing. Additionally, concern over unemployment is leading to strict tightening o f  purses 
among households, particularly among youngsters, the hardest hit by unemployment.
Even Japan’ s legendary trade surplus, measured in yen, is disappearing rapidly. In 
volume terms, for instance, import growth has outstripped export growth for nearly three 
consecutive years. Also, as a percentage o f  GDP, Japan’ s current account surplus has been 
shrinking from its peak o f  3.2 percent in 1992. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), by next year, projects a 
fall in Japan’ s current account surplus to 2.2 percent and Salomon Brothers in Tokyo projects 
that it will fall to 1 percent by early 1997.
Therefore, the Nikkei informed that several private think tanks had reviewed 
downwards their estimates o f  real economic growth, for fiscal year 1995, to "about 1 percent 
in March, anticipating that the economic recovery would slow further."
The Japanese government’ s response to these unprecedented circumstances was the 
adoption o f  two packages. First, on May 20, the Diet passed a supplementary budget for 
fiscal year 1995, amounting to $32 billion. Second, on June 8, a rescue package containing 
few details, aimed at restoring confidence in the financial system, recognized that the 
banking system’ s bad debts amounted to $470 billion. Other estimates say this last figure 
could be as high as $1 trillion.
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III. 2. JAPANESE ECONOMIC REACTIVATION 
(WDW/22/95 19 JULY 1995)
The reactivation o f  the Japanese economy is evidently linked to the rescue o f  the 
Japanese banks. This conclusion can be drawn from the components o f  both recently 
approved supplementary budgets for fiscal year (FY) 1995 and a rescue package for the 
banks (W DW /21/95, p25).
The supplementary budget, approved by the Diet on 19 May, appropriated additional 
spending o f  $32 billion, out o f  which $16.8 billion for the reconstruction o f  the damage 
caused by the Kobe earthquake o f  17 January; $9.3 billion for disaster prevention measures; 
and $5.3 billion for measures to cope with the "super" high yen.
According to Tsutomu Tanaka, vice minister o f  Japan’ s Economic Planning Agency 
(EPA), total additional spending for FY 95 will amount to $82.4 billion, including additional 
loans amounting to $38.8 billion to be granted by government financial institutions. More 
than half o f  the total, or $49.9 billion will have a direct impact on economic growth, while 
$32.5 billion will be spent to acquire land for public works. In these terms, for FY95, the 
government forecasts real GDP growth o f  2.8 percent.
The package to rescue the banks is less detailed, although the Finance Ministry 
recognized that problem loans in the banking system amounted to $473 billion. Other 
analysts consider this official figure too conservative and estimate that the amount is closer to 
$ 1 trillion. However, even the official figure is staggering. For instance, the amount o f  
taxpayers money used in the United States to bail out the savings and loans institutions 
reached $200 billion.
The immediate cause o f  Japan’ s ailing banks is usually found in the steep slide in the 
stock and real state markets, or what is commonly known as the burst o f  the speculative 
"bubble" that prevailed during the second half o f  the last decade. An Occasional Paper 
(No. 124), released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), titled Saving Behavior and 
the Asset Price "Bubble" in Japan indicates that, in the second half o f  the 1980s, Japan’ s 
stock prices tripled and land prices doubled. This surge was followed by a collapse in the 
stock market amounting to a 58 per cent reduction in the Nikkei index o f  225 stocks, from 
its peak o f  1989. Also, commercial land values have plunged by half, since they peaked in 
1991.
These figures fit the definition used in the IMF study o f  a speculative "bubble, " as "a 
continuous market overvaluation followed by a collapse." However, as stated by Juha 
Kahkonen in one o f  the papers contained in the IMF’ s Occasional Paper No. 124, 
"fundamentals also played a significant role" besides the speculative "bubble." Among these 
fundamentals, Kahkonen mentions, first, that the prices o f  stocks and real state "reflected the 
growth in the economy, in the second half o f  the 1980s real GDP increased by 25 percent,
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and corporate profits rose by 69 percent." Second, easy monetary policy also contributed to 
the inflation in asset prices, through a decline in interest rates. Third, there was "excessive 
risk taking" due to expectations o f  higher growth opportunities. And fourth, the land tax 
system also stimulated the rise in land prices.
The rescue package announced by the Finance Ministry, on June 8, consisted mainly 
o f  an authorization given to the central bank, during the next five years, to make special 
loans to bankrupt lenders under strict conditions. These special loans are conceived as a 
temporary mechanism, while the incipient Deposit Insurance Corporation is expanded and 
strengthened. Presently, the Corporation is funded by the banking industry and it has assets 
o f  870 billion yen, representing only less than 1 percent o f  all deposits.
The Finance Ministry did not allocate public funds for the banks’ rescue, because the 
use o f  taxpayers money for such a purpose is still highly controversial. In the terms o f  a 
software salesperson, quoted in the Wall Street Journal. "I can’ t stand the idea o f  those well- 
to-do people getting rescued by tax money." Also, the present mayor o f  Tokyo was elected 
because he opposed the bailout o f  two credit unions. Furthermore, there has not been a bank 
failure in Japan since the end o f  the last war and the worst crisis in the banking sector dates 
from the 1920s.
For these and other reasons, recent discussion by the Finance Ministry o f  the 
possibility o f  bank failures is rightfully seen as extraordinary and has generated all kinds o f  
speculation. For instance, the rescue package contains the following indication that the days 
may be over when the state was willing to rescue financial institutions in distress. "The 
Ministry shall prepare a framework in which the principle o f  self-responsibility can be fully 
applied to Japanese depositors as soon as possible, within five years at the latest. "
All this indicates that the problems presently affecting the Japanese banking system 
will be around for a while and they will slow down the reactivation o f  the economy. 
Additionally, the implications o f  such a situation for the international economy cannot be 
underestimated, particularly because the fifteen largest banks in the world are from Japan. 
As declared in the Washington Post by Toyoo Gyohten, the internationally well-known 
chairperson o f  the Bank o f  Tokyo, "it’ s a very hypothetical question, but if the Japanese 
stock market were to collapse, it would have rather far-reaching repercussions on Japanese 
institutions which are large holders o f  U.S. securities."
III. 3. CAN U.S. REVISIONISTS ON JAPAN CLAIM VICTORY? 
(WDW /23/95 26 JULY 1995)
Observers o f  the debate on U.S. policy toward Japan are having trouble keeping a 
score. On one side, the "revisionists" are claiming points for the outcome o f  the last
29
confrontation on Japanese imports o f  automobiles and auto parts. On the other side, 
opponents point to the bleak performance o f  the Japanese economy (WDW /21, 22/95, 
p.25-28) as evidence that the long awaited correction o f  the Japanese trade surplus is under 
way, through conventional economic measures. Meanwhile, the debate has spilled over into 
the security sphere.
Clyde Prestowitz, a member o f  the so-called "gang o f  four," the group o f  scholars 
and commentators known in the United States as "revisionists," claims that the outcome o f  
the most recent confrontation means victory for their camp. Besides Mr. Prestowitz, a 
former U.S. trade negotiator, the other members o f  the revisionist group are James Fallows, 
former correspondent o f  The Atlantic in Japan and now its Washington editor; Karel van 
Wolferen author o f  the Enigma o f  Japanese Power and a longtime resident o f  Japan, as 
correspondent for a Dutch newspaper; finally, Chalmers Johnson, considered the dean o f  the 
revisionists, a political scientist formerly at the University o f  California, San Diego.
According to Mr. Prestowitz, president o f  the Washington based think-tank Economic 
Strategy Institute, even if the outcome o f  the automobile talks in Geneva left unanswered the 
most important questions, "U.S. gains may be more than are immediately apparent."
First, the revisionists believe that Japanese capitalism is "different" and does not 
respond to ordinary remedies. Thus, the use o f  numerical benchmarks on the number o f  
dealers and purchases o f  autoparts, according to Mr. Prestowitz, are not "meaningless" and 
"the numbers are not completely without teeth." Second, the benchmark will be useful in 
monitoring progress, as they have in other cases cited as revisionist favorites, such as the 
semiconductor and flat glass agreements. Finally, the deregulation o f  the car inspection 
system is considered the most important part o f  the agreement.
Still, Mr. Prestowitz asserts that the most important issue in U.S. Japanese trade 
relations remains unanswered, whether "cartelistic Japanese business practices are compatible 
with the principles o f  free trade." Mr. Prestowitz concludes, "the issue on the table was 
really the rules o f  trade in the 21st century. Which will govern mercantilism or free trade?"
Evidently, these are profound questions that demand proportionate answers. 
Meanwhile, economists argue that the Japanese trade surplus is in the process o f  being 
corrected through conventional economic adjustment, because o f  the "super" high yen. 
Therefore, more important than the skirmishes that periodically erupt between the United 
States and Japan, the opponents o f  revisionism argue, is the prolonged sluggishness that has 
afflicted the Japanese economy for the last four years (W DW /21/95, p.25). The major 
concern, at the present juncture, is the influence the prolonged tailspin o f  the Japanese 
economy will have on the rest o f  the industrialized economies and, ultimately, on the world 
economy as a whole.
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Additionally, this is perceived as fertile ground for the coming o f  what the Wall 
Street Journal characterizes as a "nastier new era" in U.S.-Japan relations. Because the end 
o f  the Cold War has "shattered restraints on economic rivalries."
Anyhow, a debate is already under way in the United States about how to deal with 
this "new era. " In the July/August issue o f  the prestigious Foreign Affairs. Joseph Nye, 
Assistant Secretary o f  Defense for International Security Affairs, supports "the case for deep 
engagement" in East Asia. On the other side, the dean o f  the "revisionists" Chalmers 
Johnson describes Nye’ s proposal as "the Pentagon’ s ossified strategy."
According to Assistant Secretary Nye, there are at least five major strategic options 
for the United States in East Asia. These go from withdrawal, to balance-of-power politics, 
the creation o f  loose regional security institutions, a regional alliance, or to exercise 
leadership. The last is the strategic option advocated by a recently released Pentagon report, 
supervised by Assistant Secretary Nye, on United States Security Strategy for the East Asia- 
Pacific Region. This strategy o f  "deep engagement" has three components: first, to reinforce 
existing alliances; second, to maintain the presence o f  100,000 U.S. troops; and third, to 
develop regional institutions.
Professor Chalmers Johnson counters that such a strategy assumes "that nothing has 
changed in East Asia and that U.S. policy should be to freeze relations in the Pacific 
indefinitely." By contrast, Professor Johnson advocates more self-reliance and less 
dependence by Japan, even to the point where the Japanese should finance and develop their 
own military capabilities.
Whatever the outcome, the revisionists have scored an important point when they hold 
that, with the end o f  the Cold War, U.S.-Japan relations have entered a new era. However, 
it remains open i f  this will be a "nastier" era, where trade skirmishes will become major 
confrontations and Japan will end up developing its own autonomous security capabilities.
IV. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
IV. 1. EXTERNAL FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(W DW /2/95 25 JANUARY 1995)
This is the subtitle o f  the two volumes o f  World Debt Tables released on January 22, 
1995 by the World Bank. The title o f  this publication is a legacy o f  the eighties. The first 
volume even contains a section dedicated to "the twilight o f  the commercial debt crisis." By 
contrast, the subtitle is more in tune with the times, since the indebtedness o f  developing 
countries has become, for almost all o f  the middle income countries, a matter o f  access to 
international capital markets.
The first volume recognizes this by focusing on recent developments in international 
finance for developing countries. Part I o f  Volume one is dedicated to external finance for 
developing countries, with chapters on financial flows; developments in external debt; and 
the debt o f  severely indebted low-income countries.
Part II contains the following appendices: 1) debt burden indicators; 2) external debt 
restructuring, from October 1993 to September 1994, including a summary o f  multilateral 
debt relief agreements, from January 1980 to September 1994; 3) portfolio investment in 
developing countries, including a list by country o f  international bond issues, commercial 
paper issues, equity issues, and close-end entry funds, all from January 1993 to September 
1994; 4) external financing through privatization, including a list o f  privatization transactions 
between 1993-1994; 5) trends in foreign direct investment (FDI); and 6) debt conversion 
programs.
Finally, Part III contains summary statistical tables for selected regional and analytical 
groups comprising 154 developing countries.
The second volume contains statistical tables on the external debt o f  each o f  the 137 
countries that report public and publicly guaranteed debt under the Bank’ s Debtor Reporting 
System (DRS).
Two "messages" were highlighted by Michael Bruno, the Bank’ s Chief Economist and 
Vice President, at the press briefing held for the presentation o f  the Tables. On private 
capital flows, he said, "the big story has been the four-fold increase in these flows mainly to 
the middle-income developing countries." However, in 1994, "there has been a sharp 
slowdown in the growth rate o f  these flows and most recently the developments in Mexico 
have very dramatically illustrated the volatility o f  some types o f  private capital flows. " Vice 
President Bruno concluded, "notwithstanding these recent difficulties our analysis continues
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to suggest that the factors underlying the private capital flows are structural and therefore 
there is no reason for them to be reversed in the aggregate. " He also recognized that those 
countries "that depend heavily on short term portfolio flows to meet large current account 
deficits, may well experience year-to-year volatility even as the overall level o f  flows 
remains stable."
The second message from Vice President Bruno was that "although private flows have 
become the main source o f  external financing for an increasing number o f  mostly middle- 
income countries, the low-income countries (with the notable exceptions o f  China and India) 
continue to rely on official sources o f  financing, much o f  it on concessional terms."
Vice President Bruno singled out the case o f  the severely indebted low-income 
countries (SILICs). He concluded, "despite considerable efforts o f  multilateral and bilateral 
creditors to ease the debt burden o f  these countries," their debt stocks "remain unsustainable 
high."
During the press briefing, Sudarshan Gooptu, identified as "the principal author o f  the 
report" from the Bank’ s International Economics Department, described several reasons for 
the Bank’ s conclusion that "a general reversal o f  capital flows is unlikely."
First, "more than 40 percent o f  private capital flows are in FDI which is driven by 
changes in the world economy that are structural rather than temporary."
Second, "most debt-creating flows are no longer in the form o f  commercial bank 
loans, as in the 1970s, but in the form o f  bonds issued by a limited number o f  developing- 
country issuers."
Third, "emerging-market securities remain ’underweighted’ in the asset portfolios o f  
foreign institutional investors relative to the size o f  these markets." For instance, "while the 
market capitalization o f  emerging stock markets is now in excess o f  $1 trillion, accounting 
for 12 percent o f  world stock market capitalization, U.S. pension funds invest only about 1 
percent o f  their financial assets in these markets. "
Fourth, "the sources o f  flows to developing countries have become more diverse with 
greater participation by institutional investors, performance oriented traders o f  securities, 
managed funds and non-resident citizens. This diversity reduces the risk o f  a simultaneous 
drying up o f  flows as happened with commercial bank loans in the early 1980s. "
Fifth, "the probability o f  a further large and prolonged increase in international real 
interest rates appears low in the next two to five years. "
Therefore, Mr.Gooptu concluded, "the overall composition o f  aggregate resource 
flows to developing countries by income group has now become a function o f  access to 
international capital markets. "
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IV. 2. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
(W D W /15/95 31 M AY 1995)
"The global outlook is bright, but masks wide differences," says Michael Bruno, 
vice-president and Chief Economist o f  the World Bank, in the recently released Global 
Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1995. Besides medium-term projections 
(1995-2004) for the developing countries, the main theme o f  this year’ s report is 
globalization, "the most significant feature o f  the world economy." It covers the following 
chapters: 1) developing countries in an integrating world economy; 2) wider markets for 
trade: the Uruguay Round; 3) more to trade: the internationalization o f  services; 4) reverse 
linkages: growing together.
Globalization is driven by the following factors: "a near-universal push toward trade 
and capital market liberalization, increasing internationalization o f  corporate production and 
distribution strategies, and technological change that is fast eroding barriers to the 
international tradability o f  goods and services and the mobility o f  capital. "
The report’ s "central message" is that integration o f  the developing economies into 
the globalized economy "represents a major-perhaps the most important-opportunity for 
raising the welfare o f  both developing and industrial countries over the long term."
This "central message" includes five main points. First, the global economic 
environment is "better than it has been since the 1960s." Second, access by the developing 
countries to the global capital market brings important benefits and it also requires "stricter 
discipline in economic management," as showed by the recent crisis in Mexico. Third, the 
Uruguay Round achieved significant results, "but a sizeable agenda for reform remains." 
Fourth, the internationalization o f  services "will likely lead the next stage o f  economic 
globalization." Finally, the industrialized economies derive major benefits from integrating 
with the developing economies, but this also entails adjustment costs and the "difficult but 
crucial challenge o f  carrying out the transition successfully. "
The baseline projections for the decade 1995-2004 incorporate "significant revisions" 
o f  previous projections. 1) World trade will be "a major engine o f  growth," with 
merchandise trade growing at more than 6 percent a year and trade in services growing even 
faster. 2) For the developing economies, the rate o f  merchandise trade integration—measured 
by the difference between output and trade growth-was negative in 1970-85, it soared to 
almost 7 percent in 1991-94 and it is projected to average over 2 percent in the next decade. 
3) If policy reforms "stay on track," output for the developing countries is expected to 
accelerate from 2.2 percent in 1981-94 to 4.9 percent in the next decade. Therefore, their 
share o f  world output will increase from 21 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in the next ten 
years, with their exports expected to grow 1 to 1.5 percent faster than those o f  the 
industrialized countries. 4) Growth in the industrial countries is projected to average 2.8 
percent throughout the decade, with a low rate o f  inflation o f  2.7 percent. 5) Volatility in
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capital flows to developing countries will persist, but as confidence in emerging markets is 
regained moderate growth in these flows can be expected, if  interest rates remain 
"moderately high, near current levels o f  4 to 4.5 percent." 6) The long-term outlook for 
commodity prices, despite their recent cyclical surge, "remains unfavorable."
Within this positive global environment, "the baseline projection sees GDP growth in 
the developing countries accelerating from an average o f  2.2 percent since 1980 to 4.9 
percent over the coming decade. " This means that average per capita GDP growth in the 
developing countries "will rise to a little over 3 percent a year in the next decade from 
virtual stagnation in the last. "
This aggregate outlook "masks significant differences." East Asia remains the fastest 
growing, with "regional growth expected to ease to a still remarkable 7.7 percent in 1995- 
2004." If reforms are carried out in South Asia, "output growth is forecast to average 5.4 
percent." Latin America and the Caribbean remain vulnerable, but "regional growth in the 
longer run could rise by 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points above the 3.5 percent average projected 
for 1995-2004." In Europe and Central Asia "long-run potential growth could move toward 5 
percent a year. " In the Middle East and North Africa, "average regional growth may 
improve to more than 3 percent." Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa is "projected to strengthen to 
3.8 percent a year in 1995-2004 from 1.7 percent in the preceding decade."
An alternate scenario, based on a "boom-bust outcome," identifies significant risks in 
the "broadly favorable baseline outlook," such as higher interest rates in industrial countries 
and policy slippages in the developing countries. The risk derives from "higher-than- 
anticipated growth in 1995-96," generating "a global boom that reduces incentives to adjust 
and induces policy slippages in both industrial and developing countries, leading to a bust." 
By the year 2000, according to this alternate scenario, GDP in the developing countries 
would be 3.5 percent below the baseline. Another risk is a "mini-debt crisis," similar to the 
recent Mexican episode, caused by an accelerated loss o f  confidence resulting from policy 
slippages among other major recipients o f  private capital flows.
IV. 3. LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 
(W D W /16/95 7 JUNE 1995)
All the forecasts about this year’ s performance o f  the Latin American and Caribbean 
economies, issued before the Mexican crisis, have been revised downwards. The 
International Monetary Fund’ s World Economic Outlook (WDW /13/95, p. 1), optimistically, 
projects that the developing countries o f  the Western Hemisphere will grow this year at an 
average rate o f  2 1/4 percent. The World Bank’ s baseline scenario for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, presented in the last Global Economic Prospects (W DW /15/95, p.33), projects
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that growth in Latin America and the Caribbean will average 2.4 percent in 1995-96. 
However, a relatively more pessimistic alternative by the Bank projects average growth o f  
only 1.3 percent, for the same period.
These averages, as it is well known, mask wide differences in individual 
performance. There is consensus that the regional average will be pushed downwards by the 
negative performance in several major Latin American economies, such as Mexico and 
Venezuela.
For instance, the IMF’ s projection o f  2 percent negative growth in Mexico for this 
year is considered too optimistic, with some expecting that the decline will exceed five 
percent. The World Bank sees hope for the Mexican economy in the medium-term, invoking 
the precedent o f  the Chilean devaluation o f  1982, followed by a profound recession lasting 
until 1985. As recalled by the World Bank, "only with major real exchange rate adjustments 
in 1982-85, supported by wide-ranging structural reforms . . . Chile settled on its current 
stable, high-growth path." The Bank is hopeful "Mexico can follow" this precedent, "in far 
better external circumstances o f  world recovery than Chile faced in 1982."
The other economy that will experience its second year o f  negative growth this year is 
Venezuela, projected by the IMF to exhibit again negative growth o f  2 percent. Some factors 
behind the poor performance expected in the Venezuelan economy, according to the World 
Bank, are: "large macroeconomic imbalances, financial sector crisis, accelerating inflation, 
large private capital outflows, and policy reversals." These factors, "have thrown the country 
into deep recession from which recovery is likely to be slow."
In this year, according to the IMF, Argentina and Peru will also experience drastic 
reductions in last year’ s impressive rates o f  growth o f  7 and almost 10 percent, down to 3 
and 4.5 percent, respectively. Because o f  the reduction in private capital flows, says the 
World Bank, "current account adjustment was placed squarely on the agenda in Argentina 
and in Peru."
Even in Brazil, the most vigorous economy o f  the region that usually performs above 
average, the World Bank is projecting a slowdown. "Restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
set to maintain low inflation, according to the Bank, are likely to lead to some slowing in 
growth until fiscal reform can be completed." Therefore, this year, Brazilian growth is 
expected to remain close to the regional average.
Given this generalized slowdown, hidden behind the regional average, the World 
Bank finds a spectrum represented in one extreme by the Chilean economy, "which has 
combined fiscal surplus, moderate inflation, and modest external deficits and is expected to 
grow at almost 6 percent a year. " At the other extreme, the Bank places the Venezuelan 
economy, in deep recession and only slowly recovering past levels o f  performance. 
Somewhere in the middle are all the other economies o f  the region, "that have made 
substantial progress on some aspects o f  stabilization and reform but face serious problems on 
others."
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Anyway, the Bank recommends watching very closely the changes in the external 
environment faced by the developing countries, which will "influence significantly" their 
performance and policy responses. The "principal dimensions" o f  the external environment 
that should be watched are: 1) growth and inflation in the industrial countries; 2) interest 
rates; 3) capital flows; 4) world trade; and 5) commodity prices.
Briefly, in 1995-96, growth in the industrial countries is expected to remain at 2.9 
percent, with stronger performances in Japan and Europe offset by the slower growth 
expected in the United States. By contrast, there is concern that high fiscal deficits in the 
industrial countries will continue pressuring real long-term interest rates, expected to remain 
moderately high at around 4 to 4.4 percent. A reduction o f  1 percentage point in interest 
rates, for five years, is estimated to add 0.3 percent to the annual growth o f  developing 
countries and even 0.5 percent among the more indebted countries, such as those o f  Latin 
America and Africa.
Still, net private capital flows are expected to grow between 7 and 10 percent in the 
next decade and world trade will continue growing "at a brisk pace through 1996," projected 
at more than 6 percent a year. Finally, "the long term outlook for commodity prices remains 
unfavorable," with the index for non-oil commodities declining at an average o f  2 percent a 
year in 1996-2004.
The negative signals to watch are higher interest rates in the industrial countries, 
accompanied by policy slippages in the developing countries, both leading to an initial boom 
and a consequent bust.
IV. 4. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN EMERGING MARKETS 
(W DW /25/95 13 SEPTEMBER 1995)
The search for the culprit in the Mexican crisis (W DW /8/95, p.44) is still going 
strong. A  senior Mexican official blamed a bunch o f  youngsters from Wall Street, wearing 
tennis shoes and playing with their computers. By contrast, recently, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) said that domestic investors were the "front-runners" in the Mexican 
currency crisis, because they perceived the signals first.
Regardless o f  who ran first, a background paper o f  the recently released IMF report 
on capital markets (W DW /24/95, p .8) concludes that "the investor base in securities markets 
in industrial countries, and increasingly in developing countries, is dominated by a relatively 
small number o f  large institutional investors. "
The IMF also found a simultaneous "trend" toward the internationalization o f 
institutional portfolios. Additionally, one o f  the main consequences o f  this trend is that it
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accentuates "the sensitivity o f  securities markets—especially the smaller, less liquid markets, 
notably in developing countries—to the behavior o f  a relatively small number o f  investors."
The definition o f  institutional investor comprises public and private pension funds; life 
and other insurance companies; mutual funds; hedge funds; trusts; foundations; endowments; 
and proprietary trading by investment banks, commercial banks, and securities companies.
In the United States the total assets o f  the 300 largest institutional investors, in 1993, 
amounted to $7.3 trillion, or 110 percent o f  GDP, up from $535 billion in 1975, or 30 
percent o f  GDP. The same trend can be observed in other industrialized economies. In 
Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, together, the assets 
under management by pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds amounted, in 
1993, to almost $13 trillion. The relative importance o f  these figures is better appreciated 
when compared, in the same year, to global equity capitalization o f  $14 trillion and to the 
outstanding stock o f  public debt o f  the seven largest industrialized countries, which amounted 
in the same year to $9 trillion.
Given this astonishing growth in the total assets o f  institutional investors from 
industrialized countries, the next question has to do with their degree o f  international 
diversification. The IMF finds that there is a "general trend toward international 
diversification, especially by mutual funds and pension funds." Even so, the share o f  foreign 
securities in the total assets o f  institutional investors remains small. This shows the existence 
o f  a heavy bias toward domestic assets, also known as "home-asset preference," among 
institutional investors.
However, despite their domestic bias, the IMF found that institutional investor 
participation in emerging markets is increasing at "a rapid pace." Portfolio capital flows are 
experiencing "the most dramatic change," both in absolute and relative terms.
The main sources o f  these portfolio flows to emerging markets are institutional 
investors from the United States, especially mutual funds. The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) has found that between 20 and 50 percent o f  all net flows o f  capital into 
emerging markets come from the United States, with a large proportion o f  these flows going 
to the Western Hemisphere.
Emerging market mutual funds have expanded rapidly in numbers and in total assets. 
By the end o f  1993, the number o f  such mutual funds reached 594, with a total net asset 
value o f  $90 billion. In 1994, the number increased to 908 and the total net asset value 
climbed to $132 billion. In the same year, Asian markets accounted for 58 percent o f  the net 
asset value o f  all emerging market mutual funds, while Western Hemisphere markets 
accounted for 12 percent. Global emerging market mutual funds, which do not target specific 
countries or regions, were among the fastest growing with a relative participation o f  28 
percent.
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By contrast to U.S. mutual funds, U.S. pension funds are less interested in emerging 
markets. In 1993, holdings o f  emerging market securities by U. S. pension funds represented 
less than 1 percent o f  total assets, or $18 billion, less than one fifth o f  the same holdings by 
U.S. mutual funds.
Despite the impressive flows o f  capital from mutual funds, emerging market securities 
represent only 1 percent o f  total assets held in the portfolios o f  institutional investors. 
Therefore, the recent activism displayed in emerging markets by mutual funds, particularly 
those from the United States, still cannot alter the strong bias toward domestic securities that 
prevails among institutional investors. Domestic ownership in the five largest stock 
exchanges remains very high, with 92 percent in the United States, 96 percent in Japan, 92 
percent in the United Kingdom, 79 percent in Germany, and 89 percent in France.
Nonetheless, there is something distressing about this conclusion. At the still 
insignificant levels o f  internationalization described above, the emerging trend is already 
toward greater concentration o f  market power among the professional managers o f  a few big 
institutional investors. According to the IMF, this trend increases the "likelihood o f  market 
manipulation" and o f  less efficient markets, particularly in smaller emerging markets.
IV. 5. THE RISE OF THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT IN EMERGING MARKETS 
(W DW /31/95 25 OCTOBER 1995)
The numbers are there to confirm that managing the capital account is today more 
challenging than the current account. For instance, in 1994, the value o f  both world imports 
and exports, including commercial services, amounted to around $8 trillion. However, this 
amount was reached in one week o f  foreign exchange transactions. This figure also pales 
when compared, with the amount o f  outstanding derivative contracts, estimated by the 
International Monetary Fund to have reached $20 trillion in 1994.
Growth figures are even more impressive. International trade has grown recently at an 
average annual rate o f  about 4 percent, leading to 125 percent growth in the last decade. 
However, as described by the Chairperson o f  the U.S. Federal Reserve Board Alan 
Greenspan, cross-border finance has grown at a faster rate. Chairperson Greenspan mentions, 
for instance, that the stock o f  cross-border assets held by banks at the end o f  1993 was more 
than 3 1/2 times as large as at the end o f  1983. Also, annual issuance o f  international 
securities (bonds and equities) was more than four times as great in 1994 as a decade earlier, 
while global foreign exchange turnover tripled between 1986 and 1992. Finally, between 
1988 and 1993, currency and interest rate swaps expanded five-fold.
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The developing economies have not been excluded from this staggering growth in 
cross-border financial transactions. The IMF has estimated recently that net capital flows to 
these economies rose from an annual average o f  $3 billion in net outflows, between 1982-89 
during the debt crisis, to a peak o f  net inflows o f  $149 billion in 1993. These capital 
movements declined to $119 billion in 1994 and they are estimated to have further declined 
as a result o f  the Mexican financial crisis.
However, acknowledging this explosion in capital movements should not lead to the 
conclusion that globalization is now complete and that the world economy has superseded 
national boundaries. As reminded recently by the Vice-Chairman o f  the Federal Reserve 
Alan S. Blinder, "pundits o f  all kinds, perhaps in an effort to appear chic and ’with it,’ 
would have us believe that we now live in a brave—or perhaps scary—new world in which the 
old rules o f  economics no longer hold" (W DW /32/95, p. 14).
Despite the impressive growth o f  capital movements, there remains a domestic bias 
that dominates investors preferences. The IMF estimated (W DW /25/95, p .36) that domestic 
ownership in the five largest stock exchanges is still very high, 89 percent in France; 79 
percent in Germany; 96 percent in Japan; and 92 percent in both the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
Moreover, despite the also impressive growth in mutual funds dedicated to emerging 
market securities, these investments represent only 1 percent o f  total assets held by 
institutional investors in the United States.
Be it as it may, a debate is under way on how to manage these capital flows. For 
instance, last July, the IMF Board o f  Directors discussed capital account convertibility, 
understood as "freedom from exchange controls-quantitative controls, taxes and subsidies- 
applicable to transactions in the capital and financial accounts o f  the balance o f  payments. "
On the issue o f  liberalizing the capital account in emerging markets, the IMF warned 
against several risks. First, there is the macroeconomic risk derived from the impact o f 
sudden capital flows on the exchange rate and on inflation. Second, the banking system can 
be vulnerable to liquidity risks, mainly caused by short-term debts denominated in foreign 
currency. Therefore, the policy response to these risks, according to the IMF, could include 
some capital controls (W DW /24/95, p .8)
This conclusion, judged heretical by an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, is not 
enough, countered MIT Professor Rudi Dombusch. In his well-known, straightforward style, 
Professor Dombusch says "the IMF has already issued a verdict: there is a problem, 
something ought to be done, nothing can be done. "
In a recent paper presented to the last G-24 meeting, Professor Dornbusch comes out 
in favor o f  imposing a variant o f  "a Tobin tax," in the form o f "a cross border payments 
tax."
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As described by Professor Dornbusch, simply stated, the capital flow problem o f 
developing countries is that "either there is too much capital or there is too little and it is 
always mostly hot rather than cold." The policy response should be a "foreign exchange 
transactions tax. . .to lengthen horizons and shift agents from trading to investing." Among 
the supporters o f  such a tax are Nobel Laureate James Tobin and the present Undersecretary 
o f  the Treasury Lawrence Summers. The financial transactions tax would "heavily penalize 
short-run trading but puts virtually zero penalty on the long-term profitability o f  investment. "
While some distance remains to be covered before we can conclude that the world is 
moving from "industrial capitalism" into "financial capitalism," already, several interesting 
conclusions have been drawn on capital movements in so-called emerging markets. First, the 
IMF at least recognizes the need for the adoption o f  certain capital controls. Second, there is 
support among respectable academics and influential policy makers for the adoption o f  a 
"financial transactions tax." This will encourage investors to "look for assets that promise 
serious returns in the long term, not for a way to get overnight returns from the negative- 
sum game o f  volatility. "
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V. THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
V. 1. THE MEXICAN PACKAGE
(W DW /4/95 8 FEBRUARY 1995)
It is a simplification to talk about "a Mexican package," because the one finally 
approved was the third version o f  a proposal that initially was perceived as simple borrowing 
by a distressed neighbor. However, as the crisis evolved, expressing itself in the peso 
plummeting and other emerging markets heading south, each new version o f  the package 
required more support. The second version o f  the package became entangled in the new 
balance o f  power that prevails in Washington, since the last elections in November. The third 
and final version only gained acceptance when President Clinton assumed the initiative, with 
the support o f  the congressional leadership o f  both parties. Thus, sighs o f  relief were heard 
in the U.S. Congress, in Mexico, and in emerging markets throughout the world.
The first attempt, on January 3, transformed earlier promises o f  $7 billion in lines o f  
credit, from the United States and Canada, into a $18 billion package from several sources. 
The United States expanded its line o f  credit from $6 billion to $9 billion and Canada did the 
same from $1 billion to $1.5 billion. The rest consisted o f  $5 billion from the industrialized 
members o f  the Bank for International Settlements and $3 billion from a consortium o f 
private commercial banks, led by Citibank and J.P. Morgan.
Nine days later, on January 12, President Clinton announced the intention o f  
increasing the financial support available to Mexico. This time, the new package consisted o f  
$40 billion in loan guarantees that required congressional approval. Therefore, the 
Administration secured, before the announcement, the support o f  the Republican 
congressional leadership.
Additionally, on January 26, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it 
would grant to Mexico a stand-by loan o f  $7.8 billion, the largest single credit ever granted 
in the Fund’ s 50 years.
Even so, the new proposal unleashed an intense debate that never came to fruition, 
because o f  the difficulties it experienced in the U.S. Congress among the ranks o f  both 
Democrats and Republicans. These difficulties, were overcome when President Clinton 
announced, on January 31, he would act on his own authority to lead in granting support to 
M exico with a new package exceeding $50 billion. President Clinton pledged $20 billion 
from the U.S. Exchange Stabilization Fund, the IMF increased its support to the 
unprecedented amount o f  $17.8 billion, while credits from the Bank for International 
Settlements increased to $10 billion, with Canada and several Latin American countries 
contributing $1 billion each.
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This was the version that finally got the peso to bounce back to 5.35 to the dollar, 
from the alarming 6.70 attained the day before. The next day, even the severely beaten 
Mexican stock market saw price increases o f  more than 20 percent, still insufficient to move 
it out o f  the position o f  worst performer in January, with staggering losses o f  23.3 percent in 
dollar terms.
Regarding the unraveling o f  these anguishing events, in all, five weeks had to pass 
before the first signs o f  stabilization became apparent. The question is why did it take so 
long?
Now, it is easy to conclude that the magnitude o f  the crisis was underestimated. To 
be sure, the initial panic fed upon itself, in a vicious dynamic, transforming the first jitters 
into a generalized crisis o f  confidence that rippled through all emerging markets. Only 
drawing "lessons" was as swift, if  not more, particularly among those who came out, from 
both ends o f  the spectrum, to proclaim "We told you so." Also, there were those who drew 
the "half-lesson" that it is better to avoid excessive reliance on the kindness o f  foreign 
investors.
Be it as it may, the slowness o f  the response has a political dimension that cannot be 
disregarded. The new balance o f  power that presently prevails in Washington generates 
parsimony in the search for bipartisanship. True, the President and the Republican leadership 
initially approved the package containing the guarantees. However, neither the President nor 
the new congressional leaders could contain a revolt from the populist and the more liberal 
wings o f  their own parties.
The populist challenge was led by columnist Pat Buchanan, with the support o f  many 
first-year Republican members o f  Congress. "Enough is enough," Mr. Buchanan wrote in the 
Washington Times, "for once, let the idiot-bankers o f  Wall Street and their duplicitous 
Mexican clients bail themselves out. If accountability is good for welfare mothers, why isn’ t 
it good for Wall Street. "
This rift was even hurting Republican presidential politics. Senator Phil Gramm o f 
Texas supported the populist rejection o f  the guarantees, projecting himself as defender o f  
Main Street. By contrast, Senator Dole o f  Kansas supported the guarantees and was 
portrayed as defender o f  Wall Street.
Within the ranks o f  the Democrats the challenge came from the more liberal 
members. As House Minority Whip David Bonior from Michigan declared, in the 
Washington Post, " if the American people are going to be asked to guarantee billions o f  
dollars in loans to Mexico, we need to demand certain conditions, including real reforms that 
would help working people on both sides o f  the border. "
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V. 2. FALLOUT FROM THE MEXICAN PACKAGE
(W DW /5/95 15 FEBRUARY 1995)
Now that the dust has begun to settle, with the Mexican peso and emerging markets 
regaining some stability, the consequences o f  the last five weeks can begin to be sorted out.
First, there are the consequences for the Mexican economy. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 1995, the Mexican economy is projected to 
experience real economic growth o f  1.5 percent, a rate o f  inflation o f  19 percent and a 
decrease o f  the current account deficit from 8 percent to 4.3 percent o f  GDP. The 
devaluation is expected to contribute to a growth o f  exports o f  25 percent and to a decrease 
in imports o f  7 percent, which explains the drastic reduction expected in the current account 
deficit. Briefly, the Mexican economy will experience a recession that will only begin to be 
reversed sometime in 1996.
The second consequence is harder to measure because it has to do with the question 
o f  how can confidence be restored in the so-called emerging markets and in the economic 
policies o f  openness applied throughout the world. This was characterized by the IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus as the "systemic risk" emanating from the Mexican 
crisis.
The Mexican economy was playing an "exemplar" role, since it was perceived 
approaching, according to Federal Reserve Chairperson Alan Greenspan "near-first-world 
status." Thus, in Mr. Camdessus’ terms, "an unwarranted perception o f  failure o f  the 
Mexican approach might have had wide-ranging repercussions because a view might have 
spread that the market-based approach to development had failed." Chairperson Greenspan, 
saw such an outcome as "a tragic setback not only for these countries, but for the United 
States and the rest o f  the world as well."
This "systemic risk" has ignited a debate about the need for a "lender o f  last resort." 
The search is focused on the international financial institutions because, as recognized by 
Under Secretary o f  the Treasury Lawrence Summers, the United States "cannot be, and will 
not be any kind o f  lender o f  last resort." For Under Secretary Summers, the Mexican 
experience "has revealed with crystal clarity the need for thinking about what kind o f  
institutional mechanisms we can forge to deal with problems o f  this kind in the future, and 
much more importantly, to prevent problems o f  this kind from arising in the future."
A debate is already taking place, described by Peter Passell in the New York Times, 
about the need for a mechanism similar to the General Agreements to Borrow, that exist 
among the industrialized economies. C. Fred Bergsten, director o f  the Washington-based 
Institute for International Economics, supports the creation at the IMF o f  a stabilization fund 
for endangered secondary currencies, accompanied by an enhancement o f  the surveillance 
capabilities o f  the IMF. Also, Mr. Camdessus has indicated that the IMF is "drawing lessons
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from this experience with Mexico, " which he described as "the first major crisis o f  our new 
world o f  globalized financial markets to have hit a developing country. "
Not everybody agrees. MIT Professor Rudi Dombusch is concerned about "moral 
hazard," described as "the settlers inclination to move into hostile Indian territory when they 
believe the cavalry is ready to ride to the rescue." In Chairperson Greenspan’ s terms, moral 
hazard occurs "where the active involvement o f  an external guarantor distorts the incentives 
perceived by investors." The alternative, for Professor Dombusch, is "a bit less worship at 
the altar o f  wide-open international capital markets and a lot more caution on the part o f  
investors. "
Finally, there is concern that the Mexican experience may have delayed the first steps 
toward creating a free trade area in the Western Hemisphere, a goal recently adopted by the 
heads o f  state that participated in the Miami Summit o f  last December. After all, with the 
approval o f  the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico was seen as 
opening the way for extending free trade throughout the Americas.
The NAFTA debate was reopened in the U.S. Congress with the proposal o f  granting 
guarantees to Mexico. The difference, for some observers, is that this time the debate was 
nastier, because o f  the list o f  conditions that was proposed. To mention only a few o f  these 
conditions: it was proposed that Mexico stop emigration and drug trafficking; privatize the 
state oil company; stop trading with Cuba; enact labor reforms and guarantee free elections; 
create a currency board and bring back the peso exchange rate to 3.5 to the dollar; finally, 
some went as far as to propose an exchange o f  prisoners. For this reason the New York 
Times editorialized, "Mexico needs help, not extortion" and the Administration decided to go 
ahead with a package that did not have to be approved by Congress.
The question remains if, with the new balance o f  power that prevails in Washington, 
there will be enough support in Congress to begin extending trade negotiations to the rest o f  
the Hemisphere. Chile is the only country that has decided to request admission to the 
NAFTA. The U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Mickey Kantor has declared that the 
Administration is committed to complete the negotiations with Chile and to observe the 
schedule for hemispheric trade negotiations approved by the Miami Summit.
V. 3. THE SEARCH FOR THE CULPRIT IN THE MEXICAN MELTDOWN 
(W DW /8/95 8 MARCH 1995)
The debate about the Mexican package has not subsided, it is just taking an ominous 
turn. On one side are those, like Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post, who describe Mexico 
as President Clinton’ s "quagmire." Others, like Paul Gigot in the Wall Street Journal, are
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asking the ominous question o f  "who lost M exico." As it is well known, the first is an 
analogy drawn from Vietnam, while the second refers to the witch hunt unleashed by the so- 
called "loss o f  China. "
Beyond these comments, some decisive questions are being asked in the U.S. 
Congress, particularly among some newly elected Republican representatives and by the 
Chairperson o f  the Senate Banking Committee, Alphonse D ’Amato (D-NY).
In the House o f  Representatives, what Keith Bradsher in the New York Times 
characterized as an "unusual coalition" o f  liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans 
approved a resolution, 407 to 21, requesting that "the Administration turn over all its files on 
M exico’ s economy, debts and financial dealings with the United States." However, the 
resolution allows for the withholding o f  documents whose release the Administration judges 
to be "inconsistent with the public interest. "
In the Senate, the Chairperson o f  the Banking Committee is also requesting from the 
Administration the presentation o f  documents related to the Mexican package. The request, 
includes documents from the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the State Department and even 
the CIA. In letters addressed to the heads o f  these agencies, these officials are instructed to 
submit to the Senate Banking Committee "all records in your custody, control or possession 
regardless o f  format," from January 1, 1994 to the present, on Mexican currency policies 
and any assistance provided to Mexico by the Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements. Senator D ’ Amato said, "these 
documents should help answer the pivotal question—what did the Administration know about 
Mexico and when did the Administration know it?"
Senator D ’ Amato has also expressed the intention o f  organizing a major hearing to 
analyze these documents. "Now that American taxpayers have been put on the line for $20 
billion," Senator D ’Amato said, "they have an absolute right to know if  the Administration 
was asleep at the switch or helped to bring about this crisis. "
Subject to scrutiny is, first, Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence Summers, who will be 
questioned about the advice he gave to the Mexican authorities before the peso devaluation. 
Senator D ’Amato has said that he is not satisfied by the Undersecretary’ s explanations, "you 
hear Larry Summers and you watch his body language—the things he is saying, you just can’ t 
get your arms around them."
Also under the limelight is Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, confirmed by the Senate 
99-0, on January 10, in the middle o f  the crisis. Secretary Rubin has refused to reveal the 
communications between the U.S. Treasury and their Mexican counterparts. In a statement to 
the House Banking Committee, Secretary Rubin said, "it has been our position . . . that we 
should not disclose the conversations we had with another government. If we do, then 
governments in the future will not be willing to discuss these kinds o f  matters with us in a 
candid fashion." This led to the accusation, by Representative E.J. Istook (R-Okla.) that the 
Secretary o f  the Treasury was "stonewalling."
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Some Republican Representatives are also interested in Secretary Rubin’ s previous 
role as co-chairman o f  Goldman Sachs, before he joined the Clinton Administration to be 
Chairperson o f  the National Economic Council at the White House. In that position,
Secretary Rubin recused himself in matters affecting a list o f  Goldman Sachs clients, among 
which was the Mexican government.
When Representative Istook, at a hearing o f  the House Appropriations subcommittee, 
interrogated him about his ties with the Wall Street investment bank, Secretary Rubin 
answered: "what Goldman Sachs has to do with Mexico is o f  no interest to me."
Even House Speaker Newt Gingrich has been criticized by some recently elected 
Republican Representatives, for offering bipartisan support to the Mexican package. For 
instance, Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) said House Speaker Gingrich had not 
given "much attention" to the Mexican package, because he was "so focused on achieving his 
goal o f  passing his Contract with America in 100 days."
Finally, the Federal Reserve is also blamed for the Mexican crisis, because o f  the low 
interest rates policy that it had been practicing. George Melloan, in the Wall Street Journal, 
says low interest rates are responsible for pushing U.S. investors to search for higher yields 
abroad. Also Norman Bailey, in the Journal o f  Commerce, sees a replay o f  the 1982 debt 
crisis. Again, says Bailey, "the credit expansion, as a result, was directed outwards, and 
since the best available returns were in the emerging markets, the great financial asset 
inflation o f  the 1990s took place there." Thus, when interest rates increased in 1994, "the 
capital flows reversed themselves and rendered the Mexican crisis inevitable. "
V . 4. LOOKING FOR A LENDER OF LAST RESORT 
(W DW /10/95 22 MARCH 1995)
More than twenty years ago, MIT Professor Charles Kindleberger, in his book The 
World in Depression, explained that the Great Depression o f  1929-1939 was caused by 
England’ s inability and the United States unwillingness to provide the leadership required by 
the international economic system to function adequately. In Professor Kindleberger’ s terms, 
"the responsibilities o f  leadership are maintaining an open market for goods, a counter­
cyclical export o f  capital and a mechanism for rediscounting in crisis. "
Suddenly, several outbursts o f  turbulence, which have taken place in the first quarter 
o f  this year, have propelled some observers to wonder if  these attributes o f  leadership are 
readily available, in what Under Secretary o f  the U.S. Treasury Lawrence Summers 
characterizes as today’ s "age o f  rapidly moving money."
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The succession o f  events that started with M exico’ s devaluation o f  the peso, rippling 
through all emerging markets, followed by the dollar’ s most recent plunge, and the failure o f 
Barings, one o f  the oldest investment bankers, are among the events that have stimulated the 
search for leadership in today’ s international economic system.
M exico’ s devaluation o f  the peso led to a debate in the United States Congress, that is 
still raging, about the wisdom o f  the devaluation as an economic policy instrument and about 
the wisdom o f bailing out a neighbor in distress (W DW /8/95, p.44). Pressured by the 
Congress, controlled by the opposition, U.S. officials emphasized M exico’ s unique situation 
and why it is not a precedent. In Under Secretary Summers’ terms, "what compels the action 
in this special situation is the fact that Mexico is a country with which we share a 2,000 mile 
border."
Furthermore, Under Secretary Summers has emphasized repeatedly that "the United 
States cannot be, and will not be any kind o f  general lender o f  last resort" (W DW /5/95, 
p .43). This has turned the attention toward the international financial institutions, particularly 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
According to the IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, the main topic o f  the 
next spring meetings o f  the Bretton Woods institutions, to be held in Washington by the end 
o f  April, will be the creation o f  a "quick response facility" at the IMF. Also, Italian Prime 
Minister Lamberto Dini has suggested that the same issue be discussed at the G-Seven 
summit, to be held in Halifax, Canada, since the summit’ s agenda already includes a 
discussion about the future o f  the Bretton Woods institutions.
Even so, several difficulties have been identified concerning the possibility o f  granting 
the IMF the capacity to create such a facility. The main issue is the amount o f  resources 
required to make the facility credible, in a world that registers $1 trillion a day in foreign 
exchange transactions.
By contrast, the IMF’ s paid-in capital amounts to $240 billion, or only six times the 
amount o f  the Mexican rescue package. Therefore, C. Fred Bergsten, from the Washington- 
based Institute for International Economics (HE), estimates that such a "quick response 
facility" would need at least $100 billion to be credible. Never mind that this is proposed at a 
time when there is resistance, in the U.S. Congress and other industrialized countries, to 
increase contributions to the multilateral financial institutions.
Princeton University Professor Peter Kenen, anticipating some o f  these funding 
difficulties, has proposed that the facility should be self financed. Those countries that 
experience large capital inflows, Professor Kenen proposes, would be asked to deposit part 
o f  these funds at the IMF. In return, these countries would be able to borrow larger amounts 
in times o f  crisis. This raises the question o f  how to persuade the surplus countries to 
participate.
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William Cline, also from the HE, has proposed the creation of an "International 
Bondholders Insurance Corporation," to be created at the World Bank with a mixture of 
private and public capital. The corporation would operate once the IMF and the industrialized 
countries have agreed on a rescue package and its role would be to issue guarantees on a 
country’s debt in exchange for a fee. This profit making facility would have the capacity to 
guarantee debt up to a decade and its fees would vary according to the country’s financial 
standing. These fees could also be used by private investors as appropriate signals to evaluate 
their Own risks.
These proposals have been put on the table to endow the international financial 
institutions with the capacity to perform the role of lender of last resort. Also at issue is the 
role of these institutions in preventing those situations that end up requiring rescue packages 
set up in haste. Recently, for instance, the U.S. Executive Director at the IMF, Karin 
Lissakers declared that the Fund’s surveillance instruments had not worked in Mexico’s case. 
She said the fund "was not on top" of the Mexican situation.
Given the record and invoking "moral hazard" (WDW/5/95, p.43) other economists, 
such as MIT Professor Rudi Dombusch, say that there is not enough preventive care, nor 
safety net capable of substituting for the discipline that the market imposes on overambitious 
investors and governments addicted to short term capital flows.
V. 5. FACTORS BEHIND THE MEXICAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, 
ACCORDING TO THE IMF (WDW/14/95 24 MAY 1995)
The last World Economic Outlook (WDW/13/95, P.l), recently released by the staff 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), contains an annex that reviews some attempts that 
have been recently made to identify the factors responsible for the Mexican financial crisis.
After a lengthy description of the events that preceded the plummeting of the Mexican . 
peso since 1988, the annex presents "three broad and complementary views" about the causes 
of the crisis.
The first focuses on both internal and external shocks. The second emphasizes how an 
external position that became unsustainable left no option but to devalue. And the third, 
blames several policy slippages that eroded internal and external confidence.
It should be noted that the first two of these explanations almost absolve the decision 
makers of responsibility, while the third explanation blames them almost exclusively.
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The "adverse shocks" explanation identifies several domestic and external shocks that 
made it "very difficult, if not plainly impossible, for the authorities to gauge the size and 
anticipate the recurrent nature of these shocks. "
According to this view, relative calm prevailed between May and November 1994 in 
Mexican foreign exchange and financial markets. Additionally, the absence of inflationary 
pressures, may have reassured the decision makers in their perception that at least the 
domestic political shocks were temporary. Therefore, the elections and the inauguration of a 
new government were expected to contribute to overcome those sources of domestic 
instability.
However, against this viewpoint, it is argued that some external shocks were not 
transitory. The increases in international interest rates and other indicators, such as the drop 
in the Mexican stock market, could have justified the adoption of a set of measures to carry 
out a tightening of monetary conditions.
The second explanation suggests that because the stabilization program was based on 
exchange rate stability, the consequences inevitably were going to be a current account 
deficit and an overvalued exchange rate. Both the current account deficit and the appreciation 
of the exchange rate, at some point, become "unsustainable," demanding a restoration of 
competitiveness and of external equilibrium through a devaluation. The size of the current 
account deficit, at 7 percent of GDP in 1992-94 and projected to increase to 8 percent in 
1995, is used to illustrate this point.
However, a more optimistic interpretation argues that, with enough time, the external 
deficit can be reduced by the effects of increased productivity on export competitiveness, 
making the devaluation unnecessary. Unfortunately, the full effects of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could not be felt in time to avoid the devaluation. For 
instance, foreign direct investment had resumed its strong growth after the approval of the 
NAFTA and exports were expanding rapidly, even with an appreciating peso, due to gains in 
productivity.
The third viewpoint asserts that there were "policy slippages. " It is argued that a 
tighter monetary policy and an early widening of the exchange rate band were required, 
precisely, to confront the effects of the adverse shocks and the weakness of the external 
accounts.
Three indicators are recalled to illustrate this viewpoint: first, the behavior of interest 
rates; second, the management of government short-term debt; and third, the expansion of 
credit.
From the behavior of interest rates, between May and November 1994, the conclusion 
is drawn that "the authorities were attempting to accelerate the convergence of domestic 
interest rates to international levels." Additionally, the dollar indexation of short-term debt
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increased the vulnerability of the financial system, while immediately before and after the 
presidential election there was a substantial expansion of credit from commercial and 
development banks.
Against blaming these "policy slippages," it is argued that "it was very difficult to 
gauge the size and nature of the shocks." Also, it is not clear "what a tightened monetary 
policy stance would have involved in terms of output and employment losses, or whether it 
would have sufficed to avert the crisis. "
Anyhow, based on evidence from similar episodes, the conclusion is drawn that "a 
substantial hike in interest rates late in the day probably would have been insufficient to 
preclude the crisis. "
Asked to choose, the IMF staff does not pronounce itself in favor of any one of these 
explanations. The response is "all of the above" and the conclusion is that "the various 
factors behind the crisis that have been discussed in this annex probably all played a role. " 
From the beginning, the three viewpoints were presented as "not necessarily competing 
explanations of the crisis." Therefore, the conclusion is that "in all likelihood, future and 
more comprehensive analyses of this episode will find that many, if not all, of the factors 
emphasized by these views played a role in the crisis. "
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VI. TRADE
VI. 1. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S TRADE LIBERALIZATION POLICY 
(WDW/7/95 1 MARCH 1995)
The longest chapter of the last Economic Report of the President (WDW/6/95, p.21) 
is dedicated to "liberalizing international trade." Rightfully so, because it is in the field of 
international trade where the Administration exhibits some of its brightest accomplishments.
The objective of liberalizing international trade is pursued at three distinctive levels.
At the worldwide level, through multilateral initiatives such as the successful completion of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. At the regional level, through so-called "plurilateral" 
initiatives such as the enforcement of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and the agreements to move toward free trade in the Western Hemisphere by 2005, and in 
the Asia-Pacific by 2020. Finally, through bilateral initiatives with specific trading partners, 
such as the Framework for a New Economic Partnership with Japan, or the measures aimed 
at improving trade relations with China.
The Report prides itself of these accomplishments saying, "in its first two years in 
office the Administration has achieved more in international trade policy than any other 
postwar administration."
The basic rationale for pursuing trade liberalization, through this three pronged 
strategy, relies on the principle of nondiscrimination. A main consequence of practicing 
nondiscrimination is that it "makes trade liberalization a public good," because "what is 
produced by one country in negotiation with another is available to all." This generates a 
coordination problem, characteristic of all public goods, of "getting each party to participate 
rather than sit back and let others do the liberalizing, free riding on their efforts."
The way out of this "dilemma" is "commitment on the part of the major trading 
nations, coupled with ingenuity and the artful use of the fear of exclusion." Therefore, 
bilateral and regional initiatives are proposed "both as a way of extending market opening 
and as a way of pressing for greater liberalization in the full multilateral arena. "
A good summary of the Uruguay Round results is included and the chapter also 
describes the areas where multilateral negotiations are still necessary, because they could not 
be completed, such as services and agriculture. Additionally, negotiations are also required in 
other new areas, such as the environment, competition policy, investment rules, and labor 
standards.
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The Administration’s "most distinctive legacy in international trade is the foundation 
it has laid for the development of open, overlapping plurilateral trade agreements as stepping 
stones to global free trade. "
The main justification for undertaking these regional initiatives, in the Western 
Hemisphere and in the Asia-Pacific, is found in the dynamism presently exhibited by the 
economies of both regions. For instance, "both Latin America and Asia are seeing a virtual 
explosion in the number of households with middle class incomes and consumption patterns." 
Consequently, these initiatives are as "critical for placing the United States squarely at the 
fulcrum of two of the most dynamic regions of the world."
Regional agreements can become building blocks instead of stumbling blocks. These 
last are understood as "preferential trade agreements that reduce the discretion of member 
countries to pursue trade liberalization with nonmembers." By contrast, building blocks are 
those agreements "structured according to principles of openness and inclusiveness."
Thus, regionalism "is a complement rather than an alternative to U.S. multilateral 
efforts," in several ways. First, regional agreements "may achieve deeper economic 
integration among members than do multilateral accords because the commonality of interests 
is greater and the negotiating process simpler." Second, the creation of a free trade area is "a 
reinforcing process," under which "it becomes increasingly attractive for outsiders to join in 
order to receive the same trade preferences as member countries." Third, regionalism builds 
support for liberalization by encouraging "partial adjustment of workers out of the import- 
competing industries in which the country’s comparative advantage is weak, and into 
exporting industries in which its comparative advantage is strong."
Regional agreements "structured according to principles of openness" are the 
foundations of the policy of "open regionalism." This requires that trade agreements be 
"fully consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT, which prohibits an increase in average 
external barriers." Also, regional agreements should "not constrain members from pursuing 
additional liberalization either with nonmembers on a reciprocal basis or unilaterally. "
Finally, open regionalism requires that agreements "both allow and encourage nonmembers 
to join."
For all these reasons, "the United States is pursuing a policy of open regionalism.
The Administration is working to lay the foundations for a world with several overlapping, 
open plurilateral arrangements, with the United States playing a leadership role in North 
America, Asia and Latin America, rather than two or three competing blocs."
53
VI. 2. THE U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1995 
(WDW/9/95 15 MARCH 1995)
Section 1541 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 mandates that 
"the President shall submit to the Congress during each year (but not later than March 1) a 
report on A) the operation of the trade agreements program . . . and B) the national trade 
policy agenda for the year in which the report is submitted." Both requirements are contained 
in a single volume, issued on deadline, by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 
with the title 1995 Trade Policy Agenda and 1994 Annual Report of the President of the 
United States on the Trade Agreements Program.
In the introduction, USTR Michael Kantor characterizes the accomplishments of 1994 
as the conclusion of "a series of historic agreements." Ambassador Kantor mentions the 
following: 1) the approval by the U.S. Congress of the Uruguay Round, "the broadest trade 
agreement in history. " 2) The agreement reached with the leaders of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Forum (APEC), "to create free and open trade and investment by 2020 . . .  the 
fastest growing economic region on earth." 3) The agreement among the participants in the 
Summit of the Americas in Miami, "to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas." 4) The 
agreement among the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to 
include Chile. 5) Under the Framework of a New Economic Partnership, "significant 
progress in opening markets in Japan." 6) The negotiation of a procurement agreement with 
the European Union. 7) After five years of negotiations, the completion of a shipbuilding 
agreement with key nations that "will cover 80 percent of world shipbuilding." 8) The 
conclusion of textile agreements with India and Pakistan. 9) The negotiation of investment 
agreements with numerous countries, "ranging from Jamaica to the Ukraine." 10) Finally, 
initial steps were given to "address substantially the intersection of trade and the environment 
as well as trade and internationally recognized labor standards."
The main objective of the 1995 Agenda is "to implement and build on the major 
achievements of the last two years." The agenda for 1995 was defined taking into account the 
following "two long-term changes in the global economy." First, the "globalization of 
business," which has "altered the context of trade and investment policy." And second, most 
developing countries have "shifted decisively toward market-oriented policies, creating new 
market opportunities for U.S. goods and services."
The specific objectives contained in the agenda for 1995 are classified according to 
the multilateral, regional and bilateral instruments that will be utilized. Also, enforcement 
and dealing with remaining trade distortions are included as main objectives.
Multilaterally, the "first task" in 1995 is the application and enforcement of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, including the establishment of the new World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Geneva. The "second task" is to achieve progress in some specific 
sectors or areas included in the Uruguay Round. First, "market access" will focus on those 
activities where the United States is highly competitive. Second, in services, the emphasis
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will be on those sectors where commitments are still considered inadequate, such as financial 
services, basic telecommunications, and maritime services. Third, higher standards in 
intellectual property protection will be sought, particularly in the developing countries, 
beyond those contained in the Uruguay Round agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). Fourth, on investment, bilateral treaties will be negotiated and 
negotiations will be launched at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) on a Multilateral Investment Agreement. Finally, agreements on 
standards will focus on mutual recognition of testing, certification, and conformity 
assessment procedures.
Regional trade expansion includes the Americas, APEC and NAFTA. In the 
Americas, the implementation of the goal approved by the Miami Summit of creating a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas by 2005, will be pursued through existing trade and investment 
arrangements and at a ministerial meeting hosted by the United States next June in Denver. 
Within APEC, the activities will be focused on the agenda for the next leaders meeting, to be 
held in Osaka in November 1995. Finally, full accession negotiations to NAFTA with Chile 
are expected to begin after May 31.
Bilateral initiatives are identified for Japan, China and the European Union. 
Additionally, legislation will be proposed to extend the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), beyond its expiration date in July 31, 1995. Finally, the Administration will work 
with Congress to expand access to imports of textiles and apparel from the countries that 
benefit from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).
Enforcement initiatives are identified as central parts of the strategy, through Section 
301, Super 301 and Special 301 for intellectual property also through antidumping / 
countervailing actions, Title VII for government procurement and Section 1377 on 
telecommunications.
To conclude, the abolition of remaining trade distortions includes the promotion of 
deregulation and privatization, the problem of corruption, sound competition policy, to 
improve working conditions and to ensure that trade expansion and environmental policies 
are mutually supportive.
VI. 3. THE DENVER MINISTERIAL 
(WDW/17/95 14 JUNE 1995)
The plan of action issued by the thirty-four heads of state that met in Miami last 
December, mandates that the ministers of foreign trade should meet twice, in June 1995 and 
next year in March. Ambassador Mickey Kantor, Trade Representative of the United States 
(USTR), has invited his thirty-three colleagues to the first of these ministerial meetings, to be
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held in Denver, Colorado, on June 30. The ministerial meeting will be followed by a two- 
day forum of private sector representatives, sponsored by Secretary of Commerce Ron 
Brown of the United States.
In preparation of these meetings, which are the formal kick-off for the creation by 
2005 of a free trade area in the Hemisphere, an intense process of consultation at different 
levels is also under way. First, there have been bilateral consultations through the US 
embassies with each of the participating governments. Second, Associate USTR Peter 
Allgeier has met separately with representatives from the different subregional groupings that 
exist in the Hemisphere, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Central 
American Common Market (CACM), Mercosur and the Andean Pact. Finally, there have 
been consultations in Washington between deputy trade ministers and separately with the 
ambassadors accredited at the White House.
These consultations have revealed certain differences, particularly between the 
countries of Mercosur, led by Brazil, and the proposals presented by the United States. For 
instance, there is consensus about the creation of several working groups on specific issue- 
areas, which must report to the next ministerial of March 1996. However, differences remain 
about the number of working groups that will be created.
On this issue, on one side, Mercosur suggests the creation of five working groups. On 
the other, the United States suggests the creation of eleven. Brazil is proposing working 
groups on market access, investment, trade remedy measures, customs procedures and 
technical standards, and phytosanitary and sanitary measures. The United States is proposing 
the creation of working groups in market access, customs procedures, government 
procurement, services, financial services, investment, intellectual property rights, standards 
and technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phitosanitary measures, antidumping, and 
competition policy.
This debate about the number of working groups illustrates the indirect manner in 
which the participating governments are approaching the key question of how the 
hemispheric negotiations will eventually take place.
Mercosur’s position is that working groups should be created only in those areas 
where there can be rapid progress, because there already exists consensus about them. Too 
many working groups, Mercosur argues, could indicate the intention of creating a separate 
structure to carry out hemispheric negotiations. Instead, the member governments of 
Mercosur prefer deepening and expanding existing agreements.
The United States, according to a recent statement by Peter Allgeier, Associate USTR 
for the Western Hemisphere, is pursuing a two-track policy. On one track are the 
negotiations for accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as those 
launched formally in Toronto on June 7 for the accession of Chile. On the other track, are 
the hemispheric negotiations that will be launched in Denver, which may lead to a process of 
convergence among different "nodes of integration."
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The agenda proposed by the United States for the Denver ministerial includes three 
plenary sessions, a luncheon and a dinner for heads of delegation, and a closing ceremony 
where the Ministers will approve the Denver Declaration, expected to contain the navigation 
chart to approach the goal set in Miami.
In the first plenary session presentations will be made by the spokepersons of existing 
subregional agreements, Andean Pact, CACM, CARICOM, Mercosur and NAFTA and 
individual comments by participating ministers.
The second plenary session will discuss different "paths" toward the creation of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Some of the issues are: accession to, or linking 
of, existing subregional arrangements; promoting commonality in specific trade and 
investment; enhancing transparency of existing subregional agreements and domestic laws; 
means for obtaining domestic views on international trade from the private sector, including 
business, labor, small business and relevant non-governmental organizations; working toward 
common objectives in the World Trade Organization (WTO); improving working conditions; 
avoiding corrupt practices in trade and investment; perspectives of smaller nations; trade 
liberalization and environmental policies; finally, technical assistance and cooperation.
The luncheon for the heads of delegation will discuss domestic economic constraints 
and adjustments to hemispheric integration. The third plenary session will receive a report by 
the Special Commission on Trade of the Organization of American States (OAS); it will also 
discuss post-Denver mandates for the tripartite commission formed by the OAS, the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC); and it will select the host for the March 1996 ministerial. To 
conclude, the closing ceremony will approve the Denver Declaration.
VI. 4. BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES REVIEW THEIR TRADE RELATIONS 
(WDW/33/95 8 NOVEMBER 1995)
Observers recall the acrimony, short of outright rupture, which characterized 
contemporary trade relations between Brazil and the United States. Be it because of Brazilian 
opposition to the inclusion of "new themes" in the launching of the Uruguay Round; the 
imposition by the United States of countervailing duties against Brazilian imports of non 
rubber footwear; Brazilian attempts to build its own computer industry; or Brazil’s 
designation, under the U.S. section 301, as a priority country subject to retaliation because of 
its import licensing system.
Even so, these "irritants" never went as far as to cause total rupture, because there 
were simultaneous instances of fruitful cooperation among these two giants. For instance, as 
the Uruguay Round negotiations evolved, Brazil became actively involved in the Cairns
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group, with the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina and other exporters of temperate 
agricultural products. Also, in the second half of the eighties Brazil initiated a process of 
domestic adjustment and reform that has entailed a clear but gradual shift toward trade 
liberalization.
As a result, friction between Brazil and the United States has decreased to the point 
that both governments have now undertaken a comprehensive review of their trade relations.
To be sure, this ’rapprochement’ was neither linear nor without relapses. The 
domestic instability that prevailed in Brazil in the past decade, generated a policy void and 
several attempts to fill it by reverting to anachronistic forms of defensive nationalism. Some 
of these reactions even appeared recently, as alternatives to the U.S. initiative aimed at 
building a free trade area in the Western Hemisphere.
For instance, deepening first the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUL), or 
building first a South American free trade area (SAFTA) were presented as prerequisites to 
any hemispheric negotiation. Other reactions took the form of ephemeral delaying tactics 
attempted throughout the process that led to the Summit of the Americas and some of its 
subsequent activities.
Anyhow, the turning point was the state visit by the newly elected President of Brazil 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Washington, in April of this year. An almost unnoticed 
communiqué revealed that Presidents Cardoso and Clinton had instructed Brazil’s Minister of 
External Relations Felipe Lampreia and U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to review 
Brazil-U.S. trade relations.
The Presidents said the review should cover four topics: 1) bilateral trade relations; 2) 
the mutual goal of achieving a free trade area of the Americas (FTAA); 3) an expanded 
relationship between MERCOSUL and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA); and 4) cooperation in the functioning of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
As requested, on November 1, Minister Lampreia and Ambassador Kantor released 
the joint ministerial report to the Presidents containing the Brazil-United States Bilateral 
Trade Review.
The bilateral segment includes an agreement to address the following issues: 
government procurement; the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); sanitary and 
phitosanitary measures; antidumping and countervailing duty laws; overcoming obstacles to 
investment; and intellectual property rights. To carry out these commitments the support of 
the private sector will be obtained through the U.S.-Brazil Business Council, as an active 
participant in the bilateral review process.
On the FTAA, both governments support the process initiated by the Miami Summit 
and the Trade Ministerial meeting, held in Denver last June. For this purpose, they agree to
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carry out consultations before the next ministerial meeting, to be held in Cartagena, 
Colombia in March 1996.
Recognizing that MERCOSUL and NAFTA "account for more than 95 percent of the 
hemisphere’s GDP and for more than 85 percent of intra-hemisphere trade," they agreed to 
hold an initial meeting between both by July 1996.
Finally, there was agreement on seeking common ground in ongoing negotiations in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Given the relative weight of these economies, enormous potential is involved in an 
improvement of their trading relationships. To illustrate how repressed is this potential, 
consider that two way trade between the United States and Canada, in 1994, reached $250 
billion. The corresponding figure, also in 1994, between Brazil and the United States was 
$16.7 billion.
Furthermore, the Brazilian share of world exports has been decreasing, from 0.5 
percent in 1970-79 to 0.4 percent in 1994. Additionally, except for South America, the 
United States remains the most dynamic market for Brazilian exports of manufactures.
Therefore, the understanding between Brazil and the United States is a positive sign, 
amid less encouraging news such as the loss of bipartisan support that trade issues are 
experiencing in the United States. The improvement in bilateral trade relations between 
Brazil and the United States has tremendous potential and intrinsic value. Also, due to the 
participants’ relative weight, it is a fundamental requirement for the construction of any 
hemispheric-wide alternative.
VI. 5. THE END OF CONSENSUS ON U.S. COMMERCIAL POLICY? . 
(WDW/35/95 22 NOVEMBER 1995)
After the legislative elections of a year ago, which gave the Republican party control 
of both the House and the Senate, there was hope for the emergence of a solid bloc of 
bipartisan support for free trade. After all, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round were approved by the previous Congress with the support 
of most Republicans and a minority of Democrats.
However, contrary to these early hopes, the Administration and the Republican 
congressional majority, throughout this year, have disagreed over the terms in which the 
Congress may grant authorization to the President to negotiate trade agreements. Among the 
negotiating objectives, the President wants to include the protection of environmental and
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labor rights. The Republican majority holds that negotiating authority will be granted, only if 
it is circumscribed to strictly commercial objectives, without labor and environmental 
standards, in what is better known as a "clean fast track" authorization.
Despite the continued commitment to free trade of both the administration and the 
congressional majority, several attempts to bridge the distance between these two positions 
have failed. More worrisome still is the fact that, within the Republican majority, questions 
have emerged about the wisdom of negotiating more free trade agreements.
On November 3, Senator Robert Dole, Senate majority leader and front-runner in the 
race for Republican presidential candidate, declared his opposition to extending authorization 
to negotiate more free trade agreements. Senator Dole said "it would be a mistake to extend 
new fast-track authority at this time." He sees "most Americans shaking their heads," 
because they do not understand why "the President seems to want to rush into more free 
trade agreements. "
The positive reaction from the most conservative ranks of the Republican Party did 
not make itself wait. According to the Journal of Commerce. Presidential contender Patrick 
Buchanan said, "beaming," that Senator Dole’s speech proved his "message is getting 
through. We’re winning!" he exclaimed.
Furthermore, the results of a poll among 999 active voters, released last week by 
EPIC-MRA Mitchell and the Journal of Commerce, confirm Mr. Buchanan’s assertion.
The poll asked two questions based on Mr. Buchanan’s campaign proposals. The first 
question was do you "approve or disapprove of a proposal to impose tariffs on products from 
countries that have a trade imbalance with the United States?” 69 percent approved, while 22 
percent disapproved. The second question was would you "approve the imposition of tariffs 
on products from countries where workers receive extremely low wages?" 54 percent 
approved and 34 percent disapproved.
Finally, a third question asked who is responsible for the stagnation of industrial 
wages in the United States? 37 percent said trade/overseas competition; 32 percent blamed 
immigration; and 19 percent new technologies.
Trade issues may still disappear from the presidential campaign, as they did four 
years ago. Presently, they are only beginning to be part of the debate among the contenders 
for the Republican presidential nomination. However, according to the Journal of Commerce, 
the results of the poll indicate that Mr. Buchanan "is a good judge of public opinion," since 
he has made of the opposition to free trade "one of the top issues in his bid for the 
presidency."
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On the other side, the requirement that the authorization to negotiate trade agreements 
include labor and environmental standards reveals the powerful grip that, in an election year, 
these groups have on the positions adopted by the Democratic Party.
In those terms, the centrist coalition, which supported the approval of the NAFTA 
and the Uruguay Round is losing ground. It remains to be seen, if the coming elections will 
confirm or contradict this trend.
Meanwhile, several serious negotiations must wait. This is the case, for instance, of 
the commitments to liberalize trade in the Western Hemisphere by 2005, approved in the 
Miami Summit; or by 2020 in the Asia-Pacific region, as confirmed recently by the Osaka 
Summit. In Senator Dole’s terms, Congress should extend fast-track authority only after an 
"adequate cooling-off period," to allow for the digestion of the NAFTA and the Uruguay 
Round.
Seymour Lipset and Jeffrey Hayes, in a recent paper analyzing "the social roots of 
U.S. protectionism," recall that the ideological history of the United States reveals the 
existence of an "American creed," based on anti-statism, individualism, populism and 
egalitarianism. At different times, this "creed" has supported both inward looking 
isolationism and idealistic internationalism. According to Lipset and Hayes, the first 150 
years of U.S. history were of "largely uninterrupted protectionism." Outward-looking 
internationalism has been dominant only for the last fifty years, following the Great 
Depression and the last world war.
Only time can tell if the pendulum is turning back to isolationism. As the depression 
and the world war catalyzed the adoption of internationalism, the end of the cold war may 
have inaugurated a return to isolationism and protectionism.
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VII. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
VII. 1. NEW PRESIDENT FOR THE WORLD BANK 
(WDW/11/95 29 MARCH 1995)
The designation by President Clinton of the investment banker James Wolfensohn, 61, 
as new President of the World Bank, has been received positively almost everywhere. On 
March 16, the appointment was unanimously approved by the Bank’s Board of Executive 
Directors. Mr. Wolfensohn, Australian born and naturalized U.S. citizen, will become the 
ninth president of the Bank on June 1, succeeding Lewis Preston, who is retiring after three 
and a half years because of ill health.
During more than half of its fifty years of existence, the Bank was directed by two 
presidents, Eugene Black who served almost fourteen years (1949-1962) and Robert 
McNamara for more than thirteen years (1968-1981). Other presidents have served one 
period of five years and almost all have been investment bankers, as George Woods (1963- 
1968); A.W. Clausen (1981-1986); and the incumbent L. Preston, from September 1991 until 
June 1995.
Among those who have served only one term, the exception was Barber Conable. He 
was an experienced politician, member of the U.S. House of Representatives for twenty 
years, before becoming president of the Bank from July 1986 until August 1991.
Running the Bank’s operations has become a complex task, since it lends more than 
$20 billion a year and it is estimated to have almost 8,000 staff members and to hire about 
3,000 consultants. Until very recently, the daily operations of the Bank were run by Ernest 
Stem, who came to the Bank from the U.S. Agency for International Development in 1971, 
under McNamara, and rose rapidly to become senior vice president for operations in 1981, 
under Clausen. Stem recently joined J.P. Morgan, leaving behind the question of how the 
operational side of the Bank will be managed.
However, there is more to directing the bank than the operational aspects. The 
president is expected to offer inspirational leadership, to mobilize the bureaucracy and to 
persuade the donor governments and the borrowing members to move in the same direction. 
Without this inspirational role, the Bank’s president becomes a lonely figure dedicated to 
balance the interests of the bureaucracy and those of the member governments, as they 
manifest themselves in the decisions adopted by the Board of Executive Directors.
This lack of inspirational leadership has been well described by former Bank vice 
president Willi Wapenhans, who became known for a departing report, released in 1992,
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criticizing the state of the Bank’s portfolio management. According to Mr. Wapenhans, 
quoted in the Financial Times, "a distinction between corporate direction and operational 
management is presently-and has been for some time-missing. Instead, operational 
management filled the void and thereby defined strategic direction."
Mr. Wolfensohn’s credentials are perceived by almost everybody as excellent for the 
performance of this inspirational-operational role. He has the experience of a successful 
investment banker, as deputy manager of Schroders in London, as partner of Salomon 
Brothers leading the rescue o f Chrysler, and as creator of his own "investment banking 
boutique" in New York, that advises thirty multinationals under the guidance of former 
Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volker.
Also highlighted is Mr. Wolfensohn’s experience as an accomplished cellist and as 
patron of the arts. During ten years, he chaired the reconstruction of Carnegie Hall for its 
centennial, where he also performed with the New York Philharmonic to mark his 50th 
birthday. For the last five years, Mr. Wolfensohn rebuilt the finances of the Kennedy Center 
and won praise for his handling of a six week strike by the center’s Opera House Orchestra. 
These credentials were mentioned, by Peter Truell in the New York Times, to describe Mr. 
Wolfensohn as "the renaissance banker. "
President Clinton chose Mr. Wolfensohn over two insiders, Treasury Undersecretary 
Lawrence Summers and the deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund 
Stanley Fischer, both former chief economists of the World Bank. To edge out these two 
powerful insiders and other candidates, Mr. Wolfensohn’s involvement in environmental and 
development issues, reportedly, made him the candidate favored by Vice President A1 Gore.
Still, Mr. Wolfensohn’s appointment did draw some criticism, from nongovernmental 
organizations that lately have voiced their disapproval of the Bank’s lending practices. For 
example from Ms. Juliette Majot, a member of the "50 Years Is Enough" campaign that is 
calling for "profound changes in an institution whose extended midlife crisis must come to an 
end." Ms. Majot wrote in a letter to the editor of the New York Times that Mr. Wolfensohn 
will need to be more than a "Renaissance Banker," also stating that, "once again, a Wall 
Street insider has landed the job of World Bank president. " She added that Mr. Wolfensohn 
"is becoming captain of a sinking ship. It is a ship that has long been on a wrong course and 
suffers from severe structural problems. The only way to right it is to redesign it, rebuild it 
and set it on a new course." Mr. Wolfensohn, concluded Ms. Majot, "may have rebuilt 
Carnegie Hall; the World Bank is something else. "
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VII. 2. THE SPRING MEETINGS OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
(WDW/12/95 10 MAY 1995)
Three issues dominated this year’s spring meetings of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, held in Washington on April 23-27. First, the world 
economic outlook; second, the evolving role of the IMF; last, recent developments in 
exchange markets.
As it is well known, the spring meetings bring together the industrialized countries in 
the G-Seven and the G-Ten and the developing countries in the G-24. These meetings are 
held in preparation for those of the Development and Interim Committees, which oversee the 
performance of the World Bank and of the IMF, respectively.
According to the IMF staff, the recent performance of the world economy signals 
"the start of a new expansion following the 1990-93 slowdown." However, two trends "cast 
a shadow on the otherwise encouraging picture." First, the "recent changes in financial 
market sentiment toward some emerging market countries," following the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso. Second, the "turmoil in exchange markets," caused by the devaluation of the 
U.S. dollar and the corresponding appreciation of the Japanese yen and the German mark.
In the terms of U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, "we are living in a curious 
time. The fundamental health of the global economy looks stronger than it has in thirty 
years. Yet, the opportunities created by the rapid development of global capital markets have 
created new challenges, and recent turbulence in financial markets casts a shadow of 
uncertainty over the outlook. "
It is against this background that the spring meetings examined the evolving role of 
the International Monetary Fund, in an environment described by the Interim Committee "of 
increased globalization and integration of markets. "
Secretary Rubin mentioned some new realities to which the "international financial 
institutions must adapt," because "capital markets have become truly global in size and 
scope. " One example used by Secretary Rubin to illustrate how capital markets have become 
globalized is that "today, foreign exchange transactions exceed in a week the value of 
international trade for a year. "
The Mexican financial crisis revealed, according to Secretary Rubin, the need for "an 
architecture for the IMF that is as modem as the financial markets. " Moreover, Secretary 
Rubin declared that "the markets can be unforgiving if latent problems go uncorrected too 
long."
For the IMF, the Mexican episode "serves as a powerful reminder for all economies 
of the speed with which perceptions about a country’s situation can change, and of the heavy
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costs of allowing economic imbalances to persist until financial markets force the necessary 
policy adjustments."
The pillars of the new institutional architecture will allow the IMF to serve as an 
effective early warning and prevention mechanism; to respond quickly and effectively to 
liquidity crises; and to deal with the difficulties of the heavily indebted poorer countries.
Ministers and Governors of the G-Ten supported "the ongoing efforts to strengthen 
the IMF’s ability to exercise effective surveillance over its members’ policies, and to ensure 
that it has adequate resources and policies to respond promptly and effectively to temporary 
balance of payments and liquidity problems of its members."
Also, the statement issued by the G-Seven Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors recognized that the adaptation of the IMF’s role to the new circumstances would 
be a central topic for discussion at the forthcoming annual Economic Summit, to be held in 
June in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Finally, the turbulence in exchange markets was the third issue that dominated the 
spring meetings. The weakening of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen and the German 
mark have already caused some interest rate increases in certain countries and may 
exacerbate inflationary pressures in others.
The statement released by the G-Seven said that these exchange rate movements "have 
gone beyond the levels justified by underlying economic conditions in the major countries." 
Also, the G-Seven informed that there was agreement "that orderly reversal of those 
movements is desirable."
Again, Secretary Rubin was more direct to describe the present turbulence in 
exchange markets. "The movement of the dollar, Secretary Rubin said, has coincided with a 
sharper movement of some other currencies, most notably the yen." Among the reasons to 
explain this situation, Japan "unlike the other industrialized countries has no.t participated in 
the revival of activity that took hold in 1994." More to the point, Secretary Rubin declared 
"Japan needs to import more and to absorb more of its available savings, so that its external 
surplus adjusts to a more sustainable level." However, the IMF believes the threats posed by 
the turbulence in the exchange markets can be countered by "the recent decisions by 
Germany and Japan to lower official interest rates. " Also for the IMF, "it would be 
appropriate for the Federal Reserve to reinforce the actions by the Bundesbank and the Bank 
of Japan by raising short-term interest rates in the United States. "
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VII. 3. THE IMF’S ANNUAL REPORT
(WDW/26/95 20 SEPTEMBER 1995)
This year’s annual report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for the fiscal 
year ending April 30, 1995, marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference 
that created the institution.
Besides stimulating what the Report characterizes as "a lively worldwide debate about 
the functions and policies of the Fund," the anniversary year also saw some extraordinary 
events.
As recognized by the Report, "the dominant single event of the anniversary year" was 
the financial crisis in Mexico. The events that started in Mexico by the end of 1994, led to 
the largest financing package, amounting to a total of $19 billion, ever granted to any 
member country in the Fund’s fifty years.
These events also led the Fund’s Board of Directors, in April 1995, to engage in a 
discussion about the effectiveness of the Fund’s surveillance activities.
As revealed in the Report, the Board agreed that in 1994, before the outburst of the 
crisis, the relations between the Fund and Mexico "had revealed certain weaknesses." On the 
Mexican side, there were "delays" in reporting "key data to the Fund on a timely basis." On 
the IMF side, surveillance had not "functioned as a clear early warning signal to Mexico." 
The conclusion agreed by the Board was that "the responsibility was shared by the member 
and the Fund."
Additionally, during this anniversary year, the Fund attained almost universal 
membership, with the admission of Eritrea as the 179th. member. Also, there were two 
countries awaiting succession to the membership of the former Yugoslavia, the Republic of 
Serbia/Montenegro and the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, while Brunei Darussalam 
applied for membership by the end of the fiscal year.
Besides the Mexican financing package, during the fiscal year, the Fund approved 
substantial assistance for Russia and Ukraine, so-called "economies in transition from 
command to market economies," amounting to about $9.5 billion. Also, "to stop the spread 
of contagion effects arising from the crisis in Mexico," on April 6, 1995, the Board 
approved a fourth year extension of the existing arrangement with Argentina, increasing it to 
$6.3 billion.
In all, during the last fiscal year, IMF commitments under stand-by and extended 
arrangements amounted to about $24 billion, a record figure which exceeds the $22 billion 
committed a decade before, at the peak of the developing countries’ debt crisis.
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In fiscal year 1994/95, purchases (drawings) from the IMF’s general resources 
account amounted to SDR 10.6 billion, double the level of the previous year. Repurchases 
(repayments) amounted to about SDR 4.0 billion, slightly below the SDR 4.3 billion of the 
previous fiscal year.
A regional breakdown for fiscal year 1994/95 reveals that the purchases by Latin 
American countries, from Mexico and Argentina together, exceeded by far those from other 
regions and amounted to SDR 6.7 billion. Purchases by the economies in transition, Russia 
and Ukraine together, amounted to SDR 2.9 billion. By contrast, African countries purchased 
SDR 0.7 billion and Asian and Middle Eastern countries purchased SDR 0.3 billion. These 
figures reveal that without the operations in Latin America and in the transition economies, 
the use of IMF resources in the last fiscal year would have been insignificant.
The level of outstanding overdue obligations to the Fund increased slightly during 
fiscal year 1994/95, from SDR 2.9 billion on April 30, 1994 to SDR 3.0 billion on April 30, 
1995. However, the number of countries in arrears to the Fund decreased from nine to eight, 
since Haiti became the last country from the Western Hemisphere to eliminate its overdue 
obligations. Out of the eight countries in arrears, five remained ineligible to use the general 
resources of the Fund-Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, and Zambia.
For the performance of these activities, in fiscal year 1994/95, the Fund employed 
2184 staff members from 115 countries, down from the 2610 staff members from 114 
countries employed in the previous year.
The Fund’s administrative budget for the fiscal year ending April 30, 1995 amounted 
to $488.3 million and capital projects totaling $17.4 billion. Actual administrative 
expenditures reached $462.2 million and capital project disbursements totaled $32.9 million. 
For fiscal year 1995/96, the Board approved an administrative budget of $475.1 million, a 
decrease of 2.7 percent over the revised budget for the previous year, and a capital project 
budget of $13.4 million.
Finally, because of the "lively debate" generated by the fiftieth anniversary, the Fund 
is carrying out a policy of increased openness. For instance, in July 1994, the Board adopted 
the decision to make available to the public the documents that serve as background to 
Article IV consultations, known as "staff country reports," if the member government does 
not object to such disclosure. Therefore, the Report reveals that by April 30, 1995, 46 such 
documents had been released. Among them, several from Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, listed by date of release, such as El Salvador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Belize, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, Bolivia, and Jamaica.
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VII. 4. THE WORLD BANK’S ANNUAL REPORT 
(WDW/27/95 27 SEPTEMBER 1995)
The annual report of the World Bank, covering the fiscal year (FY) that goes from 1 
July 1994 to 30 June 1995, describes an institution that is undergoing profound changes.
Some of these changes are generated by external circumstances. As a consequence of 
the decline in multilateral lending, as a share of total capital flows to developing countries, 
the Bank’s functions are shifting. From the role of "primary purveyor of capital," to that of 
an advisor on investment related services, providing guarantees, aid coordination, technical 
assistance, and sectoral and macroeconomic advice. Other changes are internally driven, after 
the appointment of James Wolfensohn, as the ninth President for a term of five years that 
began on 1 June 1995. The challenges faced by Wolfensohn, a prestigious private investment 
banker and patron of the arts, basically consist in adapting the institution to these rapidly 
changing circumstances.
Wolfensohn has recognized the legacy of his predecessor, the investment banker 
Lewis Preston who was president from 1 September 1991 until his death on 4 May 1995, by 
reaffirming the fight against poverty as the Bank’s central objective. For this purpose three 
dominant themes are singled out: human resources development; environmentally sustainable 
development; and finance and private sector development. Through lending activities in these 
three areas, the Bank intends to respond to "a continuum of country needs," from those that 
are able to attract private capital flows, to those that are not yet fully integrated in the global 
economy, and those that are facing some degree of economic and social stress.
The Bank’s operations for F Y 95 reveal the distance that remains to respond fully to 
these criteria. Total new lending commitments in FY 95 amounted to $22.5 billion, an 
increase of 8 percent from the $20.8 billion of the previous year. However, from this total, 
adjustment lending amounted to 24 percent, up from the 12 percent reached in FY 94. The 
relative participation of other sectors was 17.3 percent for basic social sectors; energy 12.6 
percent; agriculture 11.8 percent; financial sector 11.4 percent; and transportation 9.5 
percent.
By regions, the biggest increase in commitments was in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, with 52 projects approved for a total of $6.1 billion, by contrast with the 
previous year when $4.7 billion were committed for 48 projects. Lending commitments also 
increased in Europe and Central Asia, with 58 projects amounting to $4.5 billion, an increase 
of $772 million over the previous year. Therefore, among the five largest borrowers of both 
Bank and International Development Association (IDA) funds, in F Y 95, China was first 
with almost $3 billion, followed by Mexico $2.38 billion; India $2.06 billion; Russia $1.74 
billion; and Argentina $1.42 billion.
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The most remarkable events of FY 95 are the reactivation of the provision of Bank 
guarantees to catalyze infrastructure finance; the approval of a project of $20 million for the 
West Bank and Gaza; and Vietnam becoming the third largest borrower of IDA credits, after 
India and China.
In the segment dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bank’s lending to 
Mexico, of $1 billion to support financial sector reform in Mexico and $500 million to 
provide a safety net to cushion the poor from the effects of the crisis, is presented as 
evidence of flexibility and responsiveness.
Furthermore the Report describes "seven fundamental lessons" that can be drawn 
from the Mexican crisis: 1) create an environment that promotes domestic savings; 2) 
encourage investment and long-term capital inflows; 3) fixed exchange rates need fiscal and 
monetary policies that can react promptly against external disequilibria; 4) promote 
productivity gains; 5) open economies subject to external shocks need healthy banking 
systems; 6) improving income distribution and reducing poverty cannot be left to trickle- 
down effects; and 7) a strong state is a prerequisite for a strong economy.
To carry out its activities, in FY 95, the Bank’s total budget amounted to $1.42 
billion. However, as announced last year, the Bank’s administrative budgets for FY 96-97 
would be reduced by approximately 12 percent. Consequently, the total budget approved for 
FY 96 is $1.38 billion, a reduction of 6.4 percent over the previous year.
To these budget cuts correspond reductions in staffing, with almost 600 persons 
expected to be declared redundant at the end of FY 96. Therefore, at the end of FY 95, there 
were 6,059 regular and fixed term staff members, down from 6,185 at the end of the 
previous year. The redundancy payments are estimated to amount to $131 million, more than 
offset by anticipated savings of $78 million in F Y 96 and $143 million in F Y 97.
Out of the total staff employed, in FY 95, 3,983 were higher-level staff (4,094 on 30 
June 1994), with 59 percent from industrialized countries and 41 percent from developing 
countries. Additionally, long-term consultants, at the end of F Y 95, amounted to 1,112 
(1,166 on 30 June 1994). Finally, out of the 186 higher-level staff recruited, during F Y 95, 
29 percent were from developing countries and 38 percent were women. Also, among the 39 
persons recruited through the Bank’s Young Professionals program, in FY 95, eleven were 
from developing countries and twenty were women.
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VII. 5. THE IMF-WORLD BANK ANNUAL MEETINGS 
(WDW/30/95 18 OCTOBER 1995)
This year’ s annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank were held in Washington, from October 5 to 12.
The main highlights of the meetings were the fallout from the Mexican crisis and a 
contradiction. Just when the world economy is becoming increasingly globalized, the 
multilateral institutions are experiencing difficulties in persuading the member governments 
to meet their financial obligations. The new President of the World Bank characterized this 
contradiction as "bitterly ironic. " This reveals how the managers are lagging behind the 
intense level of interdependence that prevails in today’s globalized economy.
Evidence of the saliency of this issue was the statement, for the first time in fifty 
years, by the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Development Committee 
meeting. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali came "at a moment of grave crisis. " He 
said, "today, the United Nations is owed a total of 3,242 million dollars." He concluded 
forcefully, "I urge you, as Ministers of Finance or Development Cooperation, to ensure that 
your countries financial obligations to the United Nations are met in time and in full 
measure. "
President Clinton closed his remarks to the annual meetings calling for funding the 
International Development Association (IDA). He said that to make a contribution to IDA, it 
was "not necessary for the United States to walk away from its commitment to balance the 
national budget." Furthermore, President Clinton said none of the 179 members of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, "including the United States can afford to detach itself from the 
business at hand and hope that others will take up the slack. "
It was in this stringent context that the IMF Managing Director proposed a set of 
measures to deal with the consequences of the Mexican crisis. Despite a certain 
defensiveness in explaining the swiftness and the magnitude of the Fund’s response to the 
Mexican crisis, Managing Director Michel Camdessus proposed and the Interim Committee 
supported the adoption of several measures.
First, "the regular and timely provision of comprehensive and good quality data, " that 
allows the Fund to carry out the task of surveillance of the members’ economies. As 
described in the communiqué of the Interim Committee, this entails the timely publication of 
12 data categories and the creation of a two-tier approach. This last consists of a general 
standard for all members and a more demanding standard "for those having or seeking access 
to the capital markets. "
The first tier of twelve indicators includes traditional figures, such as foreign 
exchange reserves; the current account balance; the central bank’s balance sheet; fiscal
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accounts; interest rates; money supply; consumer prices; output; and foreign debt and debt 
burden. The indicators constitutive of the more comprehensive standard include a sharper 
focus on others, such as indebtedness and maturities; currencies borrowed; interest rate 
spreads; and collateral.
Second, to preserve an adequate level of Fund’s liquidity, the Interim Committee 
approved the Managing Director’s suggestion of doubling the members’ quotas for the 
Eleventh Quinquennial Review.
Additionally, the Interim Committee also welcomed the proposal approved by the 
Group of Ten, "to develop new parallel financing arrangements complementary to the 
General Agreements to Borrow (GAB), with the aim of doubling the resources currently 
available. " For this purpose, contributions for another $25 billion will be requested from the 
Group of Ten and from "other countries with the capacity to support the international 
financial system." The countries mentioned as potential new contributors are Australia,
Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Spain, and Thailand.
However, the immediate reaction from the new contributors was skeptical, because 
they request, in exchange, to participate at least in the G-10 meetings. Without such 
participation, declared John Williamson from the Institute for International Economics, to 
contribute to the GAB would amount to "taxation without representation."
Managing Director Camdessus described "the persistence of zones of extreme 
poverty" as "a scandal that is potentially more disruptive to the world than ever before." 
Therefore, the "third leg of the strategy" consists in supporting the continued financing of the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), before it becomes self-sustaining. 
Additionally, the Interim Committee supported addressing the problems of the lower-income 
countries with unsustainable debt situations, including the more controversial issue of the 
debt to multilateral institutions.
Finally, a bright spot was the participation of the new World Bank Pxesident. James 
Wolfensohn’s directness and frankness have generated the impression among Bank-watchers 
that, finally, a leader like Robert McNamara has been found to run the institution. For 
example, a most quoted remark from Wolfensohn’s opening statement at the annual meetings 
had to do with the need to change the way the Bank does business. He said, "we must focus 
on our clients and results, and break the armlock that, I sense, bureaucracy has placed on 
this institution."
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